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The Stringent Takings Test for Impact Fees in
Illinois:
Its Origins and Implications for Home Rule
Units and Legislation
LISA HARMS HARTZLER*
Many Illinois municipalities impose exactions, or impact fees, on new
housing developments. Appropriate impact fees offset the anticipated financial burdens on government created by a resulting increase in population,
such as a need to build wider roads or add schools. The validity of these fees,
however, is subject to a unique and especially stringent standard under the
Illinois Constitution’s Takings Clause. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal constitution and most other state court interpretations of their respective constitutions, an impact fee in Illinois must be
“uniquely and specifically attributable” to the burdens it creates for a local
government. This article traces the origin and the development of this stringent standard by Illinois courts and how it differs from the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretations under the classic takings cases Nollan and Dolan. It
argues that the stringent standard applies with equal force to non-home rule
and home rule units, and that, in Illinois at least, municipal legislative acts
must also meet the strict standard.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, cash-strapped municipalities have begun to exact
greater cash contributions and land dedications from real estate developers
seeking to build residential communities within municipal boundaries or to
annex proposed subdivisions. These exactions from land owners are variously termed “dedications,” “contributions,” and “impact fees.”1 The American Planning Association has adopted a policy guide on impact fees.2 According to the policy:
Impact fees are payments required by local governments of
new development for the purpose of providing new or expanded public capital facilities required to serve that development. The fees typically require cash payments in advance
of the completion of development, are based on a methodology and calculation derived from the cost of the facility and
the nature and size of the development, and are used to finance improvements offsite of, but to the benefit of the development.3
Impact fees are typically imposed when a developer seeks approval of
a plat of subdivision, a zoning or comprehensive plan change, or building
permits. The Illinois Municipal Code has long permitted local governments
to exact land dedications for public uses, such as parks and school grounds,
and Illinois courts have approved requiring cash in lieu of land dedications.4
Over time, fees have grown and have been used for many public purposes,
particularly by Illinois home rule communities.

1. RONALD COPE, IMPACT FEES § 6.2 (Ill. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ., 2010 &
Supp. 2013).
2. AM. PLANNING ASS’N, APA POLICY GUIDE ON IMPACT FEES (1988),
https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/impactfees.htm1998),
https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/impactfees.htm [https://perma.cc/5UND-HLR6].
3. Id.
4. See discussion infra Section II.B.
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Impact fees can legitimately alleviate many fiscal consequences of new
development.5 New subdivisions bring more people to the community. Those
people drive on the roads, consume water, enroll their children in local public
schools, and in general, place a greater burden on municipal infrastructures
and services. Impact fees can also grow to surprisingly high levels and sometimes appear disproportionate to the development’s actual impact on a community.6 In some cities, especially those with home rule authority in Illinois,
the uses for impact fees extend over a broad range of facilities and services,
which significantly add to the cost of development. For example, the City of
Lake Forest, Illinois, imposes impact fees for schools, libraries, police services, fire and emergency services, the public works department, and park
site improvements.7 Based on a land value of $832,500 per acre, as provided
in the city’s code of ordinances,8 total impact fees calculated for a residential
lot in Lake Forest can exceed $40,000. These fees, even when on a lesser
level, are passed on to the home buyer and result in less affordable housing.9
Individual home buyers are likely unaware of the magnitude of the costs impact fees add to their purchases. Most municipal exactions are also regressive
and are typically not proportional to home value.10 Some argue that high impact fees result in fewer moderately priced homes, as builders need to “add
size and amenities to new homes to justify” a higher sale price.11

5. Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation:
Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV 177, 209-10 (2006) (enumerating seven
benefits of impact fees).
6. Fernando Villa, Koontz Curbs Government Power to Impose Development Fees,
L.A. LAW., Jan. 2014, at 14, https://www.lacba.org/docs/default-source/lal-back-issues/2014issues/january2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/XRU3-86L7].
7. CITY OF LAKE FOREST, CODE OF ORDINANCES, §§ 9-287 to 292, http://clerkshq.com/default.ashx?clientsite=lakeforest-il [https:// perma.cc/Y5FE-SUYA] . See also
Plote, Inc. v. Minnesota Alden Co., 422 N.E.2d 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1981), in which a
developer agreed to make per unit payments to the Village of Schaumburg, Illinois, for a cultural center.
8. See CITY OF LAKE FOREST, supra note 6, § 9-286(a).
9. Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 46 URB. L. 1, 15
(2014) (Professional developers may treat high exactions as a cost of doing business, but the
“economic incidence” of exactions “largely is passed on to housing purchasers and their tenants.”).
10. COPE, supra note 1, § 6.27. For example, based on the number of people and
school children estimated to be brought to the community by a new development, the owner
of a three-bedroom house valued at $100,000 would typically pay the same amount of school
impact fees as the owner of a house valued at $1,000,000.
11. Id.; see also Brett M. Baden, Don L. Coursey, & Jeannine M. Kannegiesser, “Effects of Impact Fees on the Suburban Chicago Housing Market,” The Heartland Institute, Policy No. 93 (1999), https://www.heartland.org/policy-documents/no-93-effects-impact-feessuburban-chicago-housing-market [https://perma.cc/YB4H-SAY5].
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Developers in high impact fee communities hesitate to challenge such
fees for fear of damaging their ability to do business there.12 Even if willing
to protest a municipality’s fees, they often struggle to obtain redress in Illinois courts.13 Nevertheless, municipal impact fees imposed on development
projects do have a long history of litigation on the federal and state levels.
Developers have challenged them as violating the Takings Clauses of both
the U.S. Constitution14 and the Illinois Constitution.15 To be valid under the
federal Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court requires an impact fee to have
an essential nexus to a legitimate government interest16 and that there be a
rough proportionality between the amount of the fee and that government
interest.17 Although the Illinois Supreme Court also requires a similar essential nexus, it has crafted a higher standard. A rough proportionality is not
adequate. To be valid in Illinois, the amount of an impact fee must be “specifically and uniquely attributable” to the needs created by that development.18
This higher standard theoretically should make it more difficult for municipalities to enact impact fees. To demonstrate compliance, a city or village
should be required to justify any impact fee on the basis that the amount of
Eagle, supra note 9, at 14.
Most developers, such as homebuilders, tend to be small and operate in a
limited geographical area. Numerous anecdotal accounts document the
perceived need for such developers to get along well with the local officials who have the power to approve their applications, now and in the
future, and who eventually must issue certificates of occupancy in order
for projects to be completed.
Id. (footnote omitted).
13. Indeed, developers in Illinois who pass on impact fees to their customers face
standing issues when filing suit in Illinois state courts. Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Long
Grove, 807 N.E.2d 439 (Ill. 2004) (developer did not have standing to sue for impact fee
refund since the fees were actually passed on to the lot owner by the developer). The Raintree
developer eventually got around that problem in Raintree v. Vill. of Long Grove, 906 N.E.2d
751, (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2009), with testimony that the fees were not passed on to the customer.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
15. ILL. CONST., art. I, § 15 (1970). “Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation as provided by law.”
16. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (“In short, unless the
permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building
restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’”).
17. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (“We think a term such as
‘rough proportionality’ best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth
Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”).
18. Pioneer Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill.
1961); see also N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n v. County of DuPage, 649 N.E.2d 384 (Ill. 1995).
12.
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the fees imposed can be “specifically and uniquely” attributed to the burdens
on government anticipated from a proposed development. Whether the judicial standard has had that effect is debatable. Some communities have recognized the need for conducting studies to create a methodology supporting the
amount of exactions imposed on new developments.19 Other local governments, however, particularly home rule municipalities, operate as though
home rule authority negates the necessity to meet the “specifically and
uniquely attributable” test.20 Impact fees, however, need to be justified.21
There is also a controversy over whether constitutional takings analyses are
applicable to legislative acts (i.e., that an ordinance generally applicable to
all subdivisions and developers cannot constitute a taking of private property)
within the meaning of the U.S. or Illinois Constitutions.22
This article chronicles the history of the “specifically and uniquely attributable” test in Illinois, demonstrates that the test applies equally to home

19. Champaign County, Illinois, for example, published an explanatory paper outlining the basis for impact fees and recognizing the need for developing an appropriate methodology for the different types of infrastructure needed for new developments. See generally
ANDREW LEVY, OVERVIEW OF IMPACT FEES IN ILLINOIS (Champaign Cty. Reg’l Planning
Comm’n, 2010)
http://www.impactfees.com/resource/state-local/IL_overview2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F35G-2U65].
20. For example, the City of Edwardsville, Illinois, requires a developer to contribute
a percentage of the total square footage in a proposed development to create “green space” or
to contribute cash in lieu thereof in the amount of $12,500 per acre. See CITY OF
EDWARDSVILLE, CODE OF ORDINANCES, https://library.municode.com/il/edwardsville/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CD_ORD_APXALADECO_DIV1LASUCO_ART5DEIMST
[https://perma.cc/V9MM-F94S]. A proposal made to a subcommittee of the city’s Plan Commission upped the cash contribution amount to $41,000 per acre. See EDWARDSVILLE PLAN
COMM’N MINUTES (April 16, 2018) https://www.cityofedwardsville.com/AgendaCenter/ViewFile/Agenda/_04162018-1214 [https://perma.cc/ZZB6-8PFD]; see also MINUTES OF
THE ORDINANCE SUB-COMMITTEE (March 12, 2018) https://www.cityofedwardsville.com/AgendaCenter/ViewFile/Agenda/_03122018-1192 [https://perma.cc/3Z24-8DTL].
There was no apparent analysis of the current cost of building “green space” or the current
amount of such amenities per capita provided by the city to its residents to justify such an
increase.
21. Adequate impact fee calculations involve technical analyses of existing amenities, costs of accommodating new demands for those amenities, and the proper allocation of
costs to meet those new demands. See ORANGE CTY., FL, ORANGE CTY. PARKS & RECREATION
IMPACT FEE UPDATE STUDY (June 2017), http://orangecountyfl.net/Portals/0/resource%20library/planning%20-%20development/2016%20Orange%20County%20Parks%20IF%20FINAL%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AQ3PE4KV], and Scott Thorpe, Development Impact Fee Calculation—Demystified, COSTING IN
THE CITY: COST ACCOUNTING IN LOCAL GOV’T (Jan. 17, 2016), http://www.revenuecost.com/blog/dif/development-calculation-demystified-546 [https://perma.cc/3V8V-YY64].
See AM. PLANNING ASS’N, supra note 2.
22. See discussion infra Section IV.
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rule and non-home rule municipalities that impose impact fees, and argues
that the test, at least in Illinois, applies to legislatively-imposed exactions.
II. HISTORY OF THE ILLINOIS “SPECIFICALLY AND UNIQUELY
ATTRIBUTABLE TEST”
A.

BACKGROUND

The phrase “specifically and uniquely attributable” first appeared in Illinois case law in 1960. In that pre-home rule era,23 the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld the power of a municipality to require land dedications from a
developer for schools, parks, and other public grounds.24 The court found
authority for such power under state statutes authorizing municipalities to
create plan commissions that could impose “reasonable requirements” for
those specified purposes.25 In the following year, the court crafted the standard for exactions that exists today:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to
the municipality and if the burden cast upon the subdivider
is specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity, then
the requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and
amounts to a confiscation of private property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable
regulation under the police power.26
Although the Illinois Supreme Court has been inconsistent over the
years over some related issues, like whether cash contributions were permitted under plan commission statutes, it has been very consistent in using the
“specifically and uniquely attributable” standard to determine when a developer can be required to pay for public improvements. When the United States
Supreme Court addressed a Fifth Amendment takings challenge in Dolan v.
City of Tigard in 1994, it noted the Illinois standard but chose to adopt a
lower standard of “rough proportionality.”27 Under the Illinois Constitution,
23. Home rule units were created under the 1970 Illinois Constitution, article VII,
section 6. Prior to the adoption of the 1970 Constitution, Illinois followed “Dillon’s Rule,”
under which the powers of municipal governments were limited to those expressly granted by
the Illinois Legislature and were strictly construed by the courts. The 1970 Constitution
flipped Dillon’s Rule. It gave home rule municipalities all of the powers of the State with
respect to matters pertaining to their local government and affairs that are not specifically
limited by the State Legislature as a denial of home rule power. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
24. Rosen v. Vill. of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230 (Ill. 1960).
25. Id. at 233-34.
26. Pioneer Tr. & Sav. Bank, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961).
27. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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however, this higher standard created by the Illinois Supreme Court must still
be met in Illinois.
B.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE “SPECIFICALLY AND UNIQUELY
ATTRIBUTABLE” TEST

The following chronology traces the origins and development of the
“specifically and uniquely attributable” standard through statutes and case
law.
“In 1921 the General Assembly passed an act entitled, ‘An Act in relation to plan commissions in cities, villages and incorporated towns.’”28 This
Plan Commission Act provided that (1) every municipality may create a plan
commission; (2) a plan commission has certain powers, including the preparation of a comprehensive plan of public improvements which, looking to the
present and future development of the municipality, could demand reasonable requirements for “streets, alleys, and public grounds in unsubdivided
lands within the corporate limits and in contiguous territory” not more than
one and a half miles from corporate limits; and (3) a plat of subdivision would
not be valid or entitled to be recorded unless it provided “for streets, alleys,
and public grounds in conformity with the applicable requirements of the official plan.”29 There was no reference to any “specifically and uniquely attributable” standard in this statute.
In 1956, the Illinois Supreme Court decided Petterson v. City of Naperville, the first case to interpret the Plan Commission Act.30 In that case, the
plaintiff land owners wanted to subdivide property contiguous to the City of
Naperville, which had created a plan commission and adopted both a comprehensive plan of public improvements and a subdivision control ordinance.
The city would not approve the proposed subdivision because the plaintiffs
refused to install curbs and gutters along the proposed streets in accordance
with the subdivision control ordinance. The plaintiffs asserted that, although
the city could regulate “streets, alleys, and public grounds” pursuant to the
Plan Commission Act, it had no authority to require curbs, gutters, storm
28. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 137 N.E.2d 371, 376 (Ill. 1956) (citing Laws of
1921, p. 260).
29. Id. This original Plan Commission Act was amended in 1949 to add a new paragraph applying to municipalities of more than 500,000 inhabitants or municipalities lying
wholly or partly within a radius of 30 miles from the corporate limits of municipalities of more
than 500,000 inhabitants. Id. Chicago would have been the only municipality to have more
than 500,000 inhabitants. The Plat Act was also amended to add that plats of subdivision must
be submitted to the municipal authorities for their approval if the land is located within the
corporate limits of the municipality or within contiguous territory which is affected by an
official plan; otherwise, the county must approve the plat. Id. (referencing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949,
chap. 109, par. 2).
30. Petterson, 137 N.E.2d at 371.
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drainage and other improvements not mentioned in the statute. After all, statutes granting power to municipalities had to be construed strictly if there was
any doubt as to the existence of the power.31 In this case, the court found no
doubt that the power granted under the Plan Commission Act was more expansive than a literal reading.
The court first held that the legislature clearly intended to give all municipalities extraterritorial control over the subdivision of lands within one
and a half miles beyond their corporate limits.32 It limited that power, however, by holding that such power “is, of course, always subject to the requirement that the ordinance passed pursuant to legislative authority constitutes a
valid exercise of the police power, and bears a reasonable and substantial
relation to the public health, safety or general welfare.”33 The question then
became whether the power the city was given to prescribe reasonable requirements for public streets under the Plan Commission Act, included “more than
a mere designation of the location and width of streets.”34 The court answered
that question in the affirmative. It found that street, sewage, and drainage
construction requirements contributed to the safe passage of the traveling
public and the health of citizens.35 The city’s requirements for curbs and gutters were, therefore, “within the powers conferred by the statute.”36
It is notable that in this early case, the authority for the exactions was
not challenged under a constitutional takings theory and was decided only on
the basis of municipal police powers:
The fact alone that the ordinance may operate to impose burdens or restrictions on the property which would not have
existed without the enactment of the ordinance is never determinative of the question of validity. The privilege of the
individual to use his property as he pleases is subject always
to a legitimate exercise of the police power under which new

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.

36.

Id. at 378. See discussion supra of Dillon’s Rule, note 23.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 377.
Petterson, 137 N.E.2d at 378.
Id. at 378. The court explained:
The legislature undoubtedly had in mind the complex problems connected
with the development of territory contiguous to cities as bearing on the
health and safety of all inhabitants within and without the municipality;
that in such territory, in the interest of uniformity, continuity, and of public health and safety, the streets should be constructed in such a way as to
afford reasonably safe passage to the traveling public and provide reasonable drainage in the interests of health.
Id. at 378.
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burdens may be imposed upon property and new restrictions
placed upon its use when the public welfare demands.37
In fact, the court explicitly stated that “the validity of the ordinance is to be
tested, neither by the principle of uniformity of taxation nor by the law of
eminent domain, but rather by the settled rules of law applicable to cases
involving the exercise of police powers.”38 Nevertheless, Petterson set the
stage for future exactions and impact fees.
A year after Petterson, the Illinois Supreme Court decided Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove.39 In that case, the Village passed two ordinances
under what was then Article 53 of the Revised Cities and Village Act, which
had replaced the 1921 Plan Commission Act.40 Article 53 was similar to the
prior statute in authorizing municipalities to establish plan commissions and
adopt an official plan establishing reasonable standards of design for subdivisions and unimproved land; however, the public improvements that could
be mandated were expanded.41 No longer limited to streets, alleys, and public
grounds, as in the 1921 statute, the official plan could also include “ways for
public service facilities, parks, playgrounds, school grounds, and other public
grounds.”42
The Village of Downers Grove adopted an ordinance requiring developers to “dedicate for educational purposes” such areas deemed necessary by
the plan commission, and it authorized the plan commission to impose such
other requirements to meet the needs of educational facilities.43 Under this
ordinance, the Downers Grove Plan Commission required a subdivider to
obtain a certificate of compliance from the school board in which the property was located. One plaintiff refused to obtain a certificate. Another plaintiff engaged in the business of subdividing property on a large scale obtained
a certificate only after it executed an agreement which required it to deposit
into escrow $375 for each lot sold.
In its opinion, the court acknowledged that Article 53 granted the village powers to facilitate orderly growth.44 This power, however, was not
without limits. It is in this case that the court set out for the first time the
“specifically and uniquely attributable” standard. This standard was not explicitly stated in the plan commission statute. The court created and applied
37. Id. at 379 (citation omitted).
38. Petterson, 137 N.E.2d at 380.
39. Rosen v. Vill. of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230 (Ill. 1960).
40. Id. at 232-33.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 233. The Village actually adopted two ordinances. One ordinance required
developers to dedicate for public use at least one acre per each 75 building sites or family
living units. The court determined that this ordinance was not involved in this litigation and
refused to rule on its validity.
44. Rosen, 167 N.E.2d at 233.
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the standard to determine the reasonableness of plan commission requirements:
The statutory requirement of plan-commission approval of a
plat of subdivision was designed to assist the orderly growth
of municipalities. The provisions of the statute with respect
to reasonable requirements for public streets, school grounds
and the like, appear to be based upon the theory that the developer of a subdivision may be required to assume those
costs which are specifically and uniquely attributable to his
activity and which would otherwise be cast upon the public.
It is upon this theory that we sustained the requirement that
a subdivider provide curbs and gutters in Petterson v. City
of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233.45
The court agreed with the village that requiring plat approval did offer an
appropriate point at which to collect the expenses that are necessitated by a
new subdivision.46 Nevertheless, it did “not follow that communities may use
this point of control to solve all of the problems which they can foresee.”47 A
developer may be required to provide for the needs generated by its new subdivision, but a municipality may not demand that developer to be a cash cow
to fund pre-existing or future needs of the whole community.
The court invalidated the land dedication and fees required under the
village “educational purposes” ordinance for a number of reasons, including
that the statute did not authorize monetary charges, and it authorized dedications only for “school grounds,” which is much narrower than “educational
purposes.”48 None of the reasons discussed by the court appeared to be based
on the “specifically and uniquely” requirement. Nevertheless, the court’s discussion of the validity of impact fees in Rosen became the genesis of the
Illinois standard.
45. Id. at 233-34 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 234.
47. Id. (“[T]he municipality may require the developer to provide the streets which
are required by the activity within the subdivision but can not [sic] require him to provide a
major thoroughfare, the need for which stems from the total activity of the community.”) (citing Ayres v. City Council of L.A., 207 P.2d 1 (1949)).
48. Rosen, 167 N.E.2d at 234. The court invalidated the land dedication and fees required under the village “educational purposes” ordinance because (1) the fee calculations
were based on factors totally unrelated to the proposed subdivision (e.g., the time lag between
the date when homes are occupied and the date when taxes upon the completed homes were
collected); (2) neither the plan commission nor the Village board could abdicate its authority
in favor of the local boards of education; (3) the statute did not authorize monetary charges;
and (4) the statute referred to reasonable requirements only for “school grounds,” which is
much narrower than “educational purposes.” Id.
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In 1961, the Illinois Supreme Court decided Pioneer Trust and Savings
Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect.49 In that case, a land dedication question
left undecided in Rosen was specifically at issue under the same statutory
authorization. The village passed an ordinance requiring one acre per sixty
family units to be dedicated, or given, to the village for public use. The court
noted that Rosen set out some basic principles for distinguishing between
permissible and forbidden requirements, and it quoted Rosen’s “specifically
and uniquely attributable” language as the standard by which the village’s
dedication requirements should be judged:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to
the municipality and if the burden cast upon the subdivider
is specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity, then
the requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and
amounts to a confiscation of private property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable
regulation under the police power.50
The court found that school and public recreational facilities were obviously needed and that orderly municipal development must consider these
needs.51 However, in characterizing the question in this case as one of determining who should pay for those necessities, the court (unlike in Petersen),
framed that question as a potential constitutional takings challenge. “Is it reasonable that a subdivider should be required under the guise of a police power
regulation to dedicate a portion of his property to public use; or does this
amount to a veiled exercise of the power of eminent domain and a confiscation of private property behind the defense of police regulations?”52 In this
49. Pioneer Tr. & Sav. Bank, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
50. Id. at 802.
51. Id.
52. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court did not specifically cite or refer to the Illinois
Constitution of 1870, which was applicable at the time. Article II, Section 13 of that Constitution provided “Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation. Such compensation when not made by the State, shall be ascertained by a jury,
as shall be prescribed by law. The fee of land taken for railroad tracks, without the consent of
the owners thereof, shall remain in such owners, subject to use for which it is taken.”
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (1897), http://www.idaillinois.org/cdm/ref/collection/isl2/id/396 [https://perma.cc/66FH-LBK9]. The court did quote Justice Holmes, who referred to the Fifth Amendment’s protection of property rights:
The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes
that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for
such use without compensation. A similar assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth Amendment. Hairston v. Danvill & Western
Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 605. When this seemingly absolute protection is
found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human
nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private

2018]

THE STRINGENT TAKINGS TEST FOR IMPACT FEES IN ILLINOIS

103

case, the court found that the need for additional schools was the result of
total community development and was not “specifically and uniquely attributable” to the addition of the plaintiff’s proposed subdivision. As such,
requiring the developer to pay the total cost of the remedy “would amount to
an exercise of the power of eminent domain without compensation.”53 The
court invalidated the village’s land dedication requirements.
The Illinois Supreme Court decided Pioneer on May 19, 1961. On August 4, the legislature amended the Municipal Code to delete the existing sections comprising Article 11, Section 12: “Plan Commissions.”54 New sections of the Illinois Municipal Code again expanded the powers of plan commissions and contained more specific language relating to requirements that
could be placed on developers regarding needed public improvements.55 A
plan commission’s official plan could:
(a) establish reasonable standards of design in subdivisions
and for resubdivisions of unimproved land and of areas subject to redevelopment in respect to public improvements; (b)
establish reasonable requirements governing the location,
width, course, and surfacing of public streets and highways,
alleys, ways for public service facilities, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, street lights, parks, playgrounds, schoolgrounds, size
of lots to be used for residential purposes, storm water drainage, water supply and distribution, sanitary sewers, and sewage collection and treatment; and (c) may designate land
suitable for annexation to the municipality and the recommended zoning classification for such land upon

property disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way under
the Constitution of the United States.
Pioneer, 176 N.E.2d at 802 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922)). Pennsylvania Coal was decided many years prior to Pioneer but it was the best precedent the Illinois court had. The Illinois court appears to take from the prior case that if a
requirement of property owners is based on the police power, there must be a direct relation
between the safety and welfare of the public and what the government is requiring.
53. Pioneer, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
54. 1961 Ill. Laws 2757. Prior to this amendment, on May 29, 1961, the Legislature
generally amended and re-stated the laws relating to cities, villages and incorporated towns,
naming it the “Illinois Municipal Code.” 1961 Ill. Laws 2756. The sections regarding plan
commissions were essentially the same as the old laws, but municipalities with populations
over 500,000 were given slightly expanded authority to establish reasonable standards of design for subdivisions regarding “public streets, alleys, ways for public service facilities, storm
or flood water runoff channels and basins, parks, playgrounds, school grounds, and other public grounds.”
55. 1961 Ill. Laws 2757.
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annexations, and to impose reasonable requirements for
parks, playgrounds, school grounds, and lot sizes. 56
Nevertheless, even with these expanded powers, there was still no statutory reference to a “specifically and uniquely attributable” standard, as had
been applied in Rosen and Pioneer Bank.
When the Illinois Supreme Court decided People ex rel. Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. City of Lake Forest57 in 1968, it affirmed both
Rosen and Pioneer Trust as formulating a test of the reasonableness of municipal action: if the city has the power to establish a requirement and if the
burden on the developer “is specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity,” then the requirement is not a confiscation of private property and prohibited by the Constitution.58 In this case, the city refused to approve a twolot subdivision unless the owner conceded additional street dedications. The
court could find nothing in the proposed subdivision necessitating new
streets—except to provide access to two adjacent but land-locked parcels.59
Since the burden of the requested street dedication was not “specifically and
uniquely attributable” to the proposed subdivision, the court held that the
city’s refusal to approve the developer’s plat “exceeded the bounds of permissible and reasonable regulation and would have constituted a taking of
private property for public use without compensation.”60
In Brown v. City of Joliet,61 an Illinois appellate court distinguished Exchange National Bank in upholding a plan commission’s denial of a developer’s plat until acceptable provisions were made for storm water runoff. A
city ordinance required every subdivision to be provided with a storm water
sewage or surface drainage system adequate to serve the area being platted
and “in conformity with the master storm drainage plan of the water shed of
which it is a part.”62 Plaintiff Brown’s assertion that she was being required
to provide a storm sewer for the whole general area was not supported by the
record, according to the court. Citing Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank, the
court held that, unlike the additional but unnecessary street dedications
56. Id. Further, Section 8 seems to require a municipality to purchase or condemn
lands designated for school or other public purposes. This issue was addressed in a dissent in
Bd. of Educ. of School Dist. No. 68 v. Surety Developers, 347 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. 1975) and by
the Illinois Supreme Court in Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 369 N.E.2d 892 (Ill. 1977),
where the Illinois Supreme Court held that Section 8 was an additional power granted to municipalities, not a limitation.
57. People ex rel. Exch. Nat. Bank of Chi. v. City of Lake Forrest, 239 N.E.2d 819
(Ill. 1968).
58. Id. at 822.
59. Id. at 822-23.
60. Id. at 823.
61. Brown v. City of Joliet, 247 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1969).
62. Id. at 48.
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requested for a re-subdivision in Exchange National Bank, the storm water
problem that Brown’s proposed subdivision would cause was, in fact,
“uniquely attributable” to her development alone.63
In 1975, the Illinois Supreme Court decided Duggan v. County of
Cook,64 involving the denial of a developer’s request for a zoning change and
special use permit for a mobile-home park. The Cook County Zoning Board
of Appeals recommended approval of a special use permit with seven conditions.65 One of those conditions required the developer to pay the school districts involved a total sum of $43,000.66 The Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the cash payment requirement, citing Rosen and Pioneer Trust, in holding that “there is no power under the guise of zoning authority to require the
payment of a sum of money to a school district as a condition to the zoning.”67
However, the court in a later case repudiated this holding voiding cash payments.68
In the same year as Duggan, an appellate court decided Department of
Public Works and Buildings v. Exchange National Bank.69 In this case, the
plaintiff developer executed an annexation agreement with the Village of Addison, which provided that the village would install utilities and re-zone and
annex 110 acres.70 The developer agreed to donate land for public use, which
was later changed to a cash contribution in lieu of land.71 At a meeting of the
Village Board, the developer was asked also to agree to down-zone part of
the property if the state decided to acquire it by eminent domain for a rightof-way.72 The developer orally agreed and the condition was included in an
ordinance approving the annexation.73 When the state started eminent
63. Id. at 51.
64. Duggan v. Cty. of Cook, 324 N.E.2d 406 (Ill. 1975).
65. Id. at 410. This case was decided after Illinois in 1970 adopted a new constitution
granting home rule power to municipalities with populations exceeding 25,000 and certain
forms of county government. Ill. Const.. art. 6, § 7. Cook County was then and remains the
only county with home rule authority, but that status was not an issue in Duggan. According
to the lower appellate decision, the plaintiffs filed suit in 1972, after the advent of home rule.
Duggan v. Ct. of Cook , 307 N.E.2d 782 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1974). However, the Illinois
Supreme Court reviewed a county ordinance last amended in 1968. Duggan, 324 N.E.2d at
408.
66. Duggan, 324 N.E.2d 406 at 408. Another condition was that “not more than 25%
of the home sites on the development could be made available to families with children. The
court held that this condition violated public policy.” Id. at 411.
67. Id.
68. See Bd. of Educ. of School Dist. No. 68 v. Surety Developers, Inc., 347 N.E.2d
149 (Ill. 1975), discussed infra note 78.
69. Dep’t. of Pub. Works & Bldg. v. Exch. Nat. Bank, 334 N.E.2d 810 (Ill. App. Ct.
2d Dist. 1975).
70. Id. at 814.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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domain proceedings, however, the developer attacked the down-zoning because the value of his property significantly decreased when it reverted back
to its original zoning classification.74
To determine whether the ordinance was valid, the court reviewed the
“specifically and uniquely attributable” standards set by Pioneer Trust for
determining who should bear the cost of new facilities.75 It found that the real
purpose of the down-zoning provision in the ordinance was to depress or
limit property values in order to minimize the costs of acquisition in anticipation of the condemnation proceedings. It invalidated the ordinance and
said:
Landowners may make a contract which may be recognized
as a motive for rezoning but such zoning must meet the test
of all valid zoning as above. The direct and sole purpose of
subsection 4 of the ordinance involved herein was to devalue
land to be acquired for a public purpose. The public purpose
sought to be advanced and the means taken to achieve it is
in no way specifically and uniquely attributable to the activity of the owners. It is therefore forbidden and amounts to a
confiscation of private property rather than reasonable regulation under the police power.76
Thus, the court applied the Illinois Supreme Court’s “specifically and
uniquely attributable” standard, which was developed under the land dedication provisions of the plan commission statute, to a down-zoning condition
74. The court noted that a void ordinance is subject to direct or collateral attack whenever its authority is invoked in a judicial process. Dep’t. of Pub. Works & Bldg., 334 N.E.2d
at 818. It explained:
Although in most situations a collateral attack upon zoning is not permitted in an eminent domain proceeding (see Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 291, 303
(1966), and cases there cited), that principle is inapplicable to the situation
where the condemnor purporting to exercise its police power by enacting
a zoning ordinance has in reality discriminated against a particular parcel
or parcels of land in order to depress their value with a view to future
takings in eminent domain. (4 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 12.322 (3d
ed.); Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 291, 304 (1966), section 5[b] and cases there
cited, 53 Ill.B.J. 956, 973 (1965).) In such a situation such action has been
vigorously condemned as confiscatory and the condemnee may attack the
validity of the zoning ordinance in the eminent domain action and if successful require that his property be valued free of its restrictions.
Id.
75. Id. at 819. “In answering the question who is to bear the cost of the new facilities—the municipality or the developer—it is recognized that it is proper to make the developer assume the burdens or costs which are specifically and uniquely attributable to the addition of the subdivision.” Id.
76. Id. at 819-20 (emphasis added).
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pursuant to an annexation agreement where that condition resulted in a developer contributing, in effect, to an improvement for the general public.
Also in 1975, the Illinois Supreme Court decided Board of Education of
School District No. 68, v. Surety Developers, Inc.77 In this case, a non-homerule county board required a developer to contribute land or money for school
facilities as a condition to obtaining a special use permit necessary for a new
subdivision. The developer agreed to provide both money and land in two
different agreements with the county. Again, the issue did not involve the
powers of a county plan commission to exact dedications—rather, it concerned the power of the county board under special use provisions authorized
by the county zoning statute to require contributions.78 Nevertheless, the
court discussed Rosen, Pioneer, and Exchange National Bank and held that
those cases elevated the “specifically and uniquely attributable” standard to
a constitutional basis in “land dedication requirements regardless of the legislation.”79 Consequently, irrespective of the source of legislative authority
for requiring an exaction tied to real property, the constitutional standard was
applicable.
In Surety Developers, the court found that a need for new schools was
“specifically and uniquely” (and probably solely) attributable to the proposed
subdivisions, which created a whole town on previously unincorporated
farmland.80 As such, “the conditions were authorized by statute, were a reasonable regulation under the police power, and in conformity with the [specifically and uniquely attributable constitutional] tests enunciated in Rosen
and Pioneer Trust.”81 The developer further argued that a local government
cannot require cash contributions to a school district, quoting Duggan v.
County of Cook.82 The court brushed aside the language of that case by noting
that the issue had not been “briefed or presented” to the Duggan court and,
surprisingly, proclaimed the case to have no precedential value.83 The court
failed, however, to distinguish Rosen or to offer any authority for its holding
that the cash contributions were authorized by state statute. It simply became
permissible under this case to exact cash contributions.
One justice dissented from the majority’s opinion: “The General Assembly has never authorized the sale of special use permits, nor has it ever
authorized county or municipal governing bodies to exact cash contributions
from real estate developers as the price of approval of plats of subdivision. If
77.
1975).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Bd. of Educ. of School Dist. No. 68 v. Surety Developers, 347 N.E.2d 149 (Ill.
Id. at 153.
Id.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Surety Developers, 347 N.E.2d at 153.
Id. at 154.
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such legislation should ever be adopted, it would give rise to serious constitutional questions. . . .”84 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has held fast
to Surety Developers and has never adopted this dissenting viewpoint.
In Krughoff v. City of Naperville,85 the Illinois Supreme Court appeared
to try to reconcile prior cases with regard to cash contributions. In this case,
a home rule municipality passed an ordinance requiring dedication of land or
an “in lieu” payment of cash for parks and schools as a condition for subdivision plat approval.86 The court noted the apparent inconsistencies between
cases like Rosen and Duggan, which held that there was no statutory authority for requiring cash payments, and Surety Developers, which held that a
developer could be required to contribute cash and land to a school district.87
The court stated that, while the land dedications in Rosen and Pioneer were
held invalid, it had never “held that land dedication requirements for school
grounds are unauthorized by the Municipal Code.”88 In fact, the court said, it
had always upheld “land dedication requirements proportioned to the needs
specifically and uniquely attributable to the developer’s activities.”89 The
court upheld Surety Developers and reasserted that required contributions of
land, or money in lieu of land, that were “uniquely attributable to” the needs
for new school and park facilities created by the developments were permissible under the plan commission statute.90 The court, therefore, implicitly
validated cash contributions when they were imposed or offered instead of
land exactions. Left unsaid was whether money contributions, where no land
84. Id. at 157. Justice Schaefer also asserted that Section 8 of the 1961 amendments
to the Municipal Code, passed shortly after Pioneer Trust was decided, required a municipality
to purchase or condemn land designated as necessary for school and public park sites. Id.
85. Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 369 N.E.2d 892 (Ill. 1977).
86. Id. at 894. Naperville exemplifies the need for developers to contribute to the
resulting costs of their projects to the government. According to the opinion, the population
of Naperville “increased from 7,013 in 1950 to 12,933 in 1960, 22,417 in 1970, and 28,610 in
1973.” Id. As of a 2018 partial special census estimate, the population was 147,841. CITY OF
NAPERVILLE, DEMOGRAPHICS AND KEY FACTS, http://www.naperville.il.us/about-naperville/demographics-and-key-facts/ [https://perma.cc/HL32-EA8H].
87. Krughoff, 369 N.E.2d at 895.
88. Surety Developers, 347 N.E.2d at 154.
89. Id.
90. Id. (emphasis added). In 1989, the Illinois Legislature amended the Municipal
Code (Par. 11-12-5) and the Counties Code (Sec. 25.09) regarding municipal plan commissions and similar county authority to regulate subdivisions. Act of Sept. 1, 1989, Pub. Act 86614, 1989 Ill. Laws 3341. Public Act 86-614 required that school districts containing two or
more municipalities be given an opportunity to participate in determining the amount of school
grounds, or cash in lieu thereof, to be required of new subdivisions. Id. This is the first mention
in the statute regarding cash contributions, but the Illinois Supreme Court in Surety Developers
had already held such payments permissible. The general enabling language authorizing plan
commissions to establish “reasonable standards” governing subdivisions and public improvements did not change.
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was requested, would still be upheld. This was the state of Illinois law prior
to the U.S. Supreme Court entering the field of exactions.
C.

CASE LAW UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

Although this article focuses on Illinois, any discussion of takings analyses under the Illinois Constitution must include the United States Supreme
Court’s decisions under the Fifth Amendment that were handed down while
the Illinois courts were grappling with similar issues.91 That court’s first major decision on land use exactions was decided in the 1987 case of Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission.92 In that case, the court invalidated an ordinance requiring an easement for passage to the beach in front of the plaintiff’s
home as a condition to granting a building permit for remodeling. The stated
purpose of the requirement was to preserve ocean views from the road. In
granting the plaintiff’s claim that the requirement was a taking in violation
of the Fifth Amendment, the Court said, “we must first determine whether
the ‘essential nexus’ exists between the ‘legitimate state interest’ and the permit condition exacted by the city.”93 Without such a nexus, “[t]he purpose
then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid
governmental purpose, but without payment of compensation.”94 The court
could find no nexus between preserving an ocean view and requiring the
plaintiff to grant the city an easement for walking from the road to the
beach.95 The court cited Illinois’ Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank, among many
other cases, to support its nexus requirement.96
In the 1994 case of Dolan v. City of Tigard, a landowner challenged the
city’s condition for approving her building permit application.97 The condition required a dedication of a portion of her property for flood control and
traffic improvements.98 The Supreme Court repeated Nollan’s requirement
of an essential nexus between a legitimate state interest and the exactions.99
91. It is worth noting that Illinois had a substantial body of precedent on exactions
well before the U.S. Supreme Court took up its first exaction case.
92. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
93. Id. at 837.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 838-39.
96. “Our conclusion on this point is consistent with the approach taken by every other
court that has considered the question, with the exception of the California state courts.” Id. at
839, (citing, among others, Pioneer Tr. & Sav. Bank, N.E. 2d at 802).
97. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
98. Id. at 377.
99. Id. at 383-86. The court stated that, “under the well-settled doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional
right—here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought
has little or no relationship to the property.” Id. at 385.
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Finding that a sufficient nexus existed in this case, it then added a second part
to its takings test. That part required that, “[i]f we find that a nexus exists, we
must then decide the required degree of connection between the exactions
and the projected impact of the proposed development.”100 The Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of what degree of connection should be required. It noted that some states required only a very general connection,
which it found to be “too lax.”101 It also noted that other state courts required
“a very exacting correspondence,” which the Court described as the “specific
and uniquely attributable” test.102 Crediting this test to Illinois, the court explained:
The Supreme Court of Illinois first developed this test in Pioneer Trust [citation omitted]. Under this standard, if the local government cannot demonstrate that its exaction is directly proportional to the specifically created need, the exaction becomes ‘a veiled exercise of the power of eminent domain and a confiscation of private property behind the defense of police regulations.’103
The United States Supreme Court did not adopt this Illinois standard,
holding that it did “not think the Federal Constitution requires such exacting
scrutiny, given the nature of the interests involved.”104 It did adopt a middle
ground offered by other states employing a “reasonable relationship” test.105
However, because it thought the name of that test was too confusingly similar
to the minimal-scrutiny term “rational basis,” the Court decided to call its test
a “rough proportionality” requirement.106 That standard requires a local government to “make some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development.”107
Consequently, while more demanding than just a general connection,
the necessary nexus required by the Supreme Court under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was lower than that what was necessary under
the Illinois Constitution.

100. Id. at 386.
101. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389.
102. Id. at 389.
103. Id. at 389-90.
104. Id. at 390.
105. Id. at 391.
106. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
107. Id. at 391 (“No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must
make some sort of individualized determination. . . .”).
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ILLINOIS CASE LAW CONTINUES TO APPLY THE STRICT ILLINOIS TEST

The Illinois Supreme Court continued on its own path under the Illinois
Constitution in its 1995 decision in Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass’n.,
Inc. v. County of DuPage.108 This case involved takings challenges to two
state enabling statutes and three county ordinances imposing transportation
impact fees on new development.109 The first state enabling statute authorized road impact fees “based on the amount of estimated traffic generated by
various land uses and the amount of improvements needed to maintain a reasonable level of service on the existing and proposed highway systems in
light of expected traffic growth.”110 Only one and a half years later, a second
enabling statute repealed and replaced the first, requiring that “an impact fee
payable by a developer shall not exceed a proportionate share of costs incurred by a unit of local government which are specifically and uniquely attributable to the new development paying the fee.”111
The court in Northern first acknowledged the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Nollan and Dolan, imposing the two-part test demanding (1) an
“essential nexus” between a legitimate state interest and the exaction required
and (2) the required degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development.112 The court declared a clear
nexus existed between the legitimate state interest of preventing additional
traffic congestion from new developments and providing for road improvements to address such congestion.113 It then, however, departed from the U.S.
Supreme Court and re-affirmed the “specifically and uniquely attributable”
test of Pioneer Trust as the applicable standard for determining whether the
state enabling statutes passed constitutional muster.114 The court held that
“the need for road improvement impact fees must be ‘specifically and
uniquely attributable’ to the new development paying the fee.”115
108. N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n, Inc. v. Cty. of DuPage, 649 N.E.2d 384 (1995).
109. Id. at 387.
110. Id. at 388. The Illinois Legislature passed its first road impact fee law as Section
5-608(a) of the Illinois Highway Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121, ¶ 5-608(a)). It became
effective January 1, 1988 but was repealed the next year by Pub. Act 86-97, Sec. 2, effective
July 26, 1989. Illinois Highway Code, Pub. Act 86-97, 1989 Ill. Laws 1019. This first road
impact fee statute authorized counties to collect transportation impact fees from persons constructing new developments. Northern, 649 N.E.2d at 388. It did not contain the “specifically
and uniquely attributable” language developed by Rosen and Pioneer Trust.
111. Id. at 384.
112. Id. at 389 (citing Nollan Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 at 837 (1987); Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 389 (“The appellate court correctly found, and the parties agree, that Pioneer Trust sets forth the standard applicable in this case.”).
115. Id.
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In this case, the court found that the first state enabling statute failed the
second part of the test. It wrote that the statute:
Was not written with the specifically and uniquely attributable test in mind, where no such language is contained anywhere in its three-paragraph text. Indeed, the first act directs
that the fees paid by new developments be used to fund all
road improvements ‘needed to maintain a reasonable level
of service,’ with the single proviso that ‘all expenditures
must be made for improvements within, or in areas immediately adjacent to, the transportation impact district from
which the expended monies were collected.’116
The court held that “the first enabling act [was] constitutionally flawed
because [it failed] to meet the ‘specifically and uniquely attributable’ test set
forth in Pioneer Trust.”117 Therefore, fees imposed under a county ordinance
enacted pursuant to that statute were also invalid and had to be returned.118
The second enabling act fared better. When the Illinois Legislature repealed the first statute, it passed the Road Improvement Impact Fee Law.119
116. N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n., 649 N.E.2d at 390.
117. Id. at 389.
118. Id. at 390. In a later case, fees paid could not be refunded because they were
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of DuPage,
746 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. 2001), a developer sought a refund of impact fees paid to Du Page County,
a non-home rule unit, under the first road improvement impact fee statute that was held unconstitutional in Northern. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n. The county argued that the developer’s
suit was barred by a five-year statute of limitation period that began to run when the developer
paid the fees more than five years prior to filing suit. The developer argued that the limitation
period did not begin to run until the Illinois Supreme Court had invalidated the statute in
Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass’n. “Although an impact fee is not a tax . . . the similarities
between payment of a tax, and payment of an impact fee, are sufficient to render instructive
tax cases addressing the issue of accrual.” Id. at 266. Based on those tax cases, the court held
that the developer’s action accrued when the fee was paid and, therefore, was barred in that
case.
119. 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-901 et seq. The general purpose of the statute is stated
as:
The General Assembly finds that the purpose of this legislation is to create
the authority for units of local government to adopt and implement road
improvement impact fee ordinances and resolutions. The General Assembly further recognizes that the imposition of such road improvement impact fees is designed to supplement other funding sources so that the burden of paying for road improvements can be allocated in a fair and equitable manner. It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote orderly
economic growth throughout the State by assuring that new development
bears its fair share of the cost of meeting the demand for road improvements through imposition of road improvement impact fees. It is also the
intent of the General Assembly to preserve the authority of elected local
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This statute applied to counties with a population over 400,000 and all home
rule municipalities. Thus, it enabled counties with large populations to impose road impact fees, and it prescribed a specific procedure for them and
home rule municipalities to follow. The statute contained the “specifically
and uniquely attributable” language, developed by Rosen and Pioneer Trust.
For purposes of road impact fees:
“Specifically and uniquely attributable” means that a new
development creates the need, or an identifiable portion of
the need, for additional capacity to be provided by a road
improvement. Each new development paying impact fees
used to fund a road improvement must receive a direct and
material benefit from the road improvement constructed
with the impact fees paid. The need for road improvements
funded by impact fees shall be based upon generally accepted traffic engineering practices as assignable to the new
development paying the fees.120
The Illinois Supreme Court held that this second legislative attempt did
comply with the constitutional requirements outlined in Pioneer Trust by including a mandate that “an impact fee payable by a developer shall not exceed a proportionate share of costs incurred by a unit of local government
which are specifically and uniquely attributable to the new development paying the fee.”121 Consequently, fees imposed by the county under an ordinance
passed pursuant to the second act were “not a confiscation of private property
in violation of the takings clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions” but
were “instead a reasonable regulation under the police power.”122 Remarkably, this is the court’s first explicit reference to the Illinois Constitution’s
takings clause.
An interesting question in this case is why the court struck down the
first enabling act on the grounds that it failed to include the “specifically and

government officials to adopt and implement road improvement impact
fee ordinances or resolutions which adhere to the minimum standards and
procedures adopted in this Division by the State.
605 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5/-902.
120. N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n, 649 N.E.2d at 389-90; 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-903.
121. “We believe that this language comports with the dictates of Pioneer Trust,
wherein this court indicated that an exaction which required a developer to provide for improvements ‘which are required by [his] activity,’ would be permissible, but one which required him to provide for improvements made necessary by ‘the total activity of the community,’ would be forbidden.” N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n, 649 N.E.2d at 390 (citing Rosen, 167
N.E.2d 230 (Ill. 1960); Pioneer Tr. & Sav. Bank, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961)).
122. Id. at 390-91.
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uniquely attributable” language in the statute.123 In prior cases regarding
school fees and land dedications, the court held that particular language to be
a standard that the actual application of those fees needed to meet; it did not
require the standard to be stated in the statute enabling the creation of local
government plan commissions.124 Indeed, the Illinois Municipal Code, granting municipalities the power to create plan commissions and to regulate, approve, and place conditions on the development of new subdivisions, did not
contain a reference to those special words, but the court has never held that
section of the Municipal Code invalid. It has ruled only that particular ordinances passed pursuant to the statute, or the application of particular ordinances, were unconstitutional if the exactions imposed did not meet the state
“specifically and uniquely attributable” standard established by the court.125
Nevertheless, this case firmly established the standard in Illinois’ takings jurisprudence.
After Northern Illinois Home Builders, an appellate court invalidated a
municipal ordinance using the less stringent federal takings analysis. In
Amoco Oil Company v. Village of Schaumburg,126 a village conditioned approval of a special use permit on the dedication of land for street widening.
The permit was necessary to begin a remodeling project on an existing gas
station. The improvement was estimated to add a de minimus increase (0.4%)
in traffic on the street, but the village asked for twenty percent of the plaintiff’s property as a condition for granting the building permit.127 The appellate
court first applied the Dolan constitutional standard of “rough proportionality” and determined that the exaction could not meet that test, making the
required dedication an improper taking without just compensation.128 The
court concluded that if the exaction could not meet the lesser federal standard,

123. The appellate court did not discuss the constitutionality of the two enabling statutes but concluded in its opinion that both enabling acts were constitutional. N. Ill. Home
Builders Ass’n v. County of Du Page, 621 N.E.2d 1012, 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1993).
The court upheld the county ordinances as meeting the judicial “specifically and uniquely
attributable” standard because they were well-crafted and relied on a large amount of data on
traffic needs of specific roads created by a computer model; the county also used county records and a study of land values. Id. at 1020.
124. See Rosen, 167 N.E.2d 230; Pioneer Tr. & Sav. Bank, 176 N.E.2d 799 at 802;
Dep’t. of Pub. Works & Bldg. v. Exch. Nat. Bank, 334 N.E.2d 810 (2d Dist. 1975).
125. See discussion regarding home rule authority infra Part III. It is possible that the
court required the “specifically and uniquely attributable” standard to be in the state statute
because it was not an enabling statute for home rule units. Rather, it was a limitation on home
rule units in that it specified certain procedures for imposing road impact fees. See N. Ill. Home
Builders Ass’n, 649 N.E.2d at 387.
126. Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1995).
127. Id. at 383.
128. Id. at 391.
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it also clearly could not meet the higher “specifically and uniquely attributable” test under the Illinois Constitution.129
In 2002, another Illinois appellate court held in Thompson v. Village of
Newark that a non-home rule unit could not require a school impact fee for
construction of school buildings.130 The court stated that a non-home rule
village could not impose any exactions or impact fees without legislative authority.131 It reviewed Section 11-12-5 of the Municipal Code as it was in
effect in 1990, which authorized a comprehensive plan and ordinances establishing reasonable requirements governing, among other things, “school
grounds.”132 As a non-home rule unit of government, the village had “only
those powers expressly granted, powers incident to those expressly granted,
and powers indispensable to accomplish the municipality’s purpose.”133 Although the Municipal Code had long been construed to require a developer to
provide basic improvements, such as sidewalks and curbs, such necessities
directly benefited the development, while “[a] school, on the other hand, may
inure to the benefit of others outside the development.”134 In this case, because the enabling statute referred only to “school grounds,” the court concluded that impact fees for school building construction were not authorized.135 Without legislative authority, the village’s ordinance was void.136
In the wake of Thompson, the Illinois Legislature again amended the
impact fee enabling provisions in the Illinois Municipal Code and the Counties Code in 2003 to expand the definition of school grounds.137 The amendments added a new definition of “school grounds” to include “school buildings or other infrastructure necessitated and specifically and uniquely attributable to the development or subdivision in question.”138 Note that this is
the first mention of the “specifically and uniquely attributable” standard in
the Illinois municipal and county government codes.139 Under existing case
129. Id.
130. Thompson v. Village of Newark, 768 N.E.2d 856 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2002).
131. Id. at 542.
132. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-12-5 (2000).
133. Thompson, 768 N.E.2d at 858.
134. Id. at 859.
135. Id. at 860 (citing Rosen, 167 N.E.2d at 230); Krughoff, 369 N.E.2d at 892).
136. Thompson, 768 N.E.2d at 860.
137. Illinois Public Act 93-330.
138. Illinois Municipal Code, 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-12-5(7) (emphasis added). The
Illinois Counties Code, 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1042, contains the same definition with the
exception that the word “municipality” is replaced with “county.”
139. The Road Improvement Impact Fee Law, discussed supra note 118, is in the Illinois Highway Code, Chapter 605, Division 9. It is not contained in the Illinois Municipal Code
or the Counties Code, although it does authorize counties with a population over 400,000 and
all home rule municipalities to enact road improvement impact fees and provides a method for
doing so.
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law, local governments were already subject to this standard for all authorized exactions.
In the 2008 case of Empress Casino Joliet v. Giannoulias,140 the Illinois
Supreme Court defined some limits on the application of the constitutional
test described in Rosen and subsequent cases. In Empress Casino, the court
upheld the constitutionality of a state statute that imposed a three percent
surcharge on riverboat casinos having gross revenues over $2,000,000.141
The plaintiff casino argued, among other things, that the surcharge was an
unconstitutional taking under the federal and state constitutions and pointed
for support to Northern Illinois Home Builders.142 The court held that a takings analysis was applicable only in cases involving fees imposed in connection with land.143 The court distinguished the fee in Northern Illinois Home
Builders as one that “was imposed on persons constructing new housing developments to fund road improvements made necessary in light of the expected traffic growth from the development.”144 As such, that impact fee was
“inextricably tied to real property,” making a takings analysis appropriate.145
That monetary exactions are subject to Nollan/Dolan if there is a direct link
between the demand and the property is exactly what the Illinois Supreme
Court expressed in Northern Illinois Home Builders and Empress Casino.146
In this regard, the Illinois Supreme Court presaged the U.S. Supreme Court’s
2013 decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District.

140. Empress Casino Joliet v. Giannoulias, 896 N.E.2d 277 (Ill. 2008).
141. Id. at 282.
142. Id. at 292; see N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n., 649 N.E.2d at 388; Dolan, 512 U.S.
at 391, where the court applied a state constitutional takings analysis to state enabling statutes
and county ordinances imposing transportation impact fees.
143. Empress Casino, 896 N.E.2d at 292.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. In reviewing Eastern Enterprises, the Illinois Supreme Court found Justice Kennedy’s separate opinion most persuasive:
The Coal Act imposes a staggering financial burden on the petitioner,
Eastern Enterprises, but it regulates the former mine owner without regard
to property. It does not operate upon or alter an identified property interest, and it is not applicable to or measured by a property interest. The Coal
Act does not appropriate, transfer, or encumber an estate in land (e.g., a
line on a particular piece of property), a valuable interest in an intangible
(e.g., intellectual property), or even a bank account or accrued interest.
The law simply imposes an obligation to perform an act, the payment of
benefits. The statute is indifferent as to how the regulated entity elects to
comply or the property it uses to do so.
Empress Casino, 896 N.E.2d at 292-93 (quoting Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,
540 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment, dissenting in part)).
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In Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove,147 an appellate court
delved into the limits of the fees that were authorized by the Illinois Municipal Code. In that case, a developer sued the village for a refund of impact
fees for school operations and open space on the basis that the required fees
exceeded the non-home rule village’s statutory and constitutional authority.148 An Illinois appellate court agreed with the developer. First, even
though the Municipal Code’s definition of school grounds had been expanded to include building construction, it still did not authorize a non-home
rule village to impose exactions for school operations, which are necessary
ongoing costs required to educate all local students, not merely students from
a new subdivision.149 The court again reiterated the basic Illinois requirement
under Rosen and Pioneer Trust that the statutes permitting “reasonable requirements for streets and public grounds are based upon the theory that ‘the
developer of a subdivision may be required to assume those costs which are
specifically and uniquely attributable to [the developer’s] activity and which
would otherwise be cast upon the public.’”150 The court apparently determined that ongoing school operations should be funded by all those taxpayers
residing in each local school district in accordance with Illinois’ scheme for
funding public education.151
Second, the village’s impact fees included payment to enable the village
to “acquire, maintain, and preserve open space,” including an allocation to
the village park district for general operational expenses.152 The developer
147. Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Long Grove, 906 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d
2009). This case followed an initial unsuccessful attempt by Raintree Developers to challenge
the Village of Long Grove’s impact fees. In the first case, Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Long
Grove, 807 N.E.2d 439 (Ill. 2004), the developer testified that he increased the cost of each
lot sold by $7300, the amount of the impact fees. Because the developer passed on the cost of
the fees and did not dispute that fact, the court ruled that the fees were actually paid by the lot
owner and not the developer. Therefore, the developer lacked standing to sue for a refund of
fees paid by someone else. Id. at 448. The merits of the case were not reached and the basis
for the developer’s constitutional claim was not explored. The developer apparently overcame
this standing problem five years later in this case, where the developer testified that the amount
of the impact fees was not passed on to the ultimate buyers of homes built on the developed
lots. Raintree Homes, 906 N.E.2d at 779-80.
148. Id. The court also held that the one-year statute of limitations under the Governmental Tort Immunity Act applied to tort actions only and was not applicable to plaintiff’s
constitutional claim.
149. Id. at 766-67 (“The plain meaning of the term ‘school grounds,’ even under its
more expansive definition effective as of 2003, is not, in our view, so broad as to encompass
a ‘general operation fund.’”).
150. Id. at 766.
151. Local property tax levies for school funding are authorized at 105 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/17-2. See Allen D. Schwartz, Illinois School Finance - A Primer, 56 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 831, 841-46 (1980). Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol56/iss3/5 [https://perma.cc/KB8Z-8V7N] (last visited Sept. 17, 2018).
152. Raintree Homes, 906 N.E.2d at 768.
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argued that under the Illinois Municipal Code, impact fees were authorized
for reasonable requirements governing parks and playgrounds but did not
mention open space.153 The appellate court assumed, without deciding, that
open space could be considered a park or playground under the Municipal
Code. Making this assumption, it concluded the village impermissibly exceeded its authority by failing to “limit the use of impact fees to only newly
acquired open space.”154 Thus, an ordinance requiring impact fees that would
be used to maintain and preserve existing open space would not pass the “specifically and uniquely attributable” test because a developer could be asked
to assume costs not attributable solely to the developer’s activities.155 The
court then invalidated the village ordinances as lacking statutory authority. 156
To some extent, the Raintree Homes opinion muddied the water surrounding the Illinois takings test as created under Rosen and Pioneer Homes.
The court recognized that there are two parts to the test and got it right when
it concluded that the Municipal Code authorized impact fees for school
grounds but did not authorize impact fees for school operations. “As the supreme court has explained, to satisfy the Rosen test, the requirements must
be: (1) within the statutory grant of power to the municipality; and (2) specifically and uniquely attributable to the developer’s activity. Here, the Village’s ordinances [regarding school impact fees] fail[ed] the first part of the
supreme court’s test.”157 As to the open space issue, however, the court
jumped over the first part of the test by assuming that impact fees for open
spaces were authorized as parks under the Municipal Code. It then held under
the second part of the test that fees for acquiring, maintaining, and preserving
open space must encompass existing open space and, therefore, could not be
specifically and uniquely attributable to the developer’s activity.158 Yet, the
court explicitly, and wrongly, invalidated the ordinance imposing impact fees
for open space because the village exceeded its statutory authority—the first
part of the test. It should have concluded that the ordinance was invalid because preserving existing open space could not pass the second part of the
test requiring that the need for an open space impact fee was specifically and
uniquely attributable to the developer’s new subdivision. One can understand
why the court was unwilling to wade into the semantics of what is a park
versus an open space, but deciding whether the Municipal Code actually authorized fees for open space would have been the only way to conclude that
the village exceeded its authority. The result was correct. The ordinance was
153. Id. at 766 (citing 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-12-5).
154. Id. at 769.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Raintree Homes, 906 N.E.2d at 767-68 (citing Pioneer Tr. & Sav. Bank, 176
N.E.2d 799).
158. Id. at 769.
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invalid, but the reasoning was confused. Under the court’s explanation, the
authority was assumed—the term “parks” included open space and, therefore
was authorized—but it was the “specifically and uniquely attributable” second part of the Rosen test that the court concluded the ordinance failed.159
The 2009 appellate court decision in Raintree Homes is the most recent
Illinois case to discuss the “specifically and uniquely” standard for land dedications and exactions. Despite the muddled conclusion of that case, the law
in Illinois has remained relatively steady since the Illinois Supreme Court
advanced the standard in 1960 under Rosen v. Vill. of Downers Grove. Understandably, developers have had greater success in challenging municipal
impact fees when they have focused on non-home rule governments. The
authority of a non-home rule municipality or county to impose impact fees is
constrained by the enabling statutes found in the Illinois Municipal Code and
the Counties Code. Those enabling acts are limited and strictly construed.
Consequently, when a landowner or developer was willing to take on a nonhome rule municipality over school impact fees or land dedications beyond
the specific purposes enumerated in the statute, several such challenges have
been successful over the years.160
Challenging home rule units is more difficult, however, because of the
broad authority the 1970 Illinois constitution granted to them. Unless the
Legislature specifically restrains the power of a home rule municipality or
county, such as under the Road Impact Fee statute, it will possess wide
159. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois provided its
interpretation of the “specifically and uniquely attributable test.” Chicago Title Insurance Co.
v. Vill. of Bolingbrook, 1999 WL 65054 (N.D. Ill. 1999),(vacated on jurisdictional grounds
and dismissed without prejudice, Chicago Title, 1999 WL 259952 (N.D. Ill. 1999). In this
case, the home rule Village of Bolingbrook required developers to pay recapture fees for previously improved roads abutting a proposed subdivision. The court noted that home rule municipalities have the authority under Illinois law to impose recapture or impact fees that pertain
to its government and affairs. Id. (citing Beneficial Dev. Corp. v. City of Highland Park, 641
N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1994)). “Such municipalities, however, are bound to exact fees that satisfy
the ‘exacting’ and ‘stringent requirements’ of the ‘specifically and uniquely attributable’ test.”
Id. (citing Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass’n, supra note 108). Because Bolingbrook
failed to present any evidence that it considered or forecasted the amount of traffic to be generated by the development prior to imposing its recapture fee, it could not, therefore, demonstrate that the fee met the specifically and uniquely attributable test. The court held that the
recapture fee ordinance violated the Illinois Constitution, but subsequently vacated that ruling
because it should not have exercised jurisdiction over the state constitutional issue when it
dismissed all of the federal claims.
160. Raintree Homes v. Village of Long Grove, 906 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
2009) (Municipal Code authorized exactions to fund school grounds and buildings, but not
school operations; court did not decide whether “open space” was authorized under parks and
playgrounds); Thompson v. Vill. of Newark, 768 N.E.2d 856 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2002),
(Municipal Code authorized exactions for purchase of school grounds but not construction of
school buildings); Rosen, 167 N.E.2d at 230 (statute authorized dedications for school grounds
but not general educational purposes).
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authority to impose dedications and other exactions. Challenges to home rule
units, therefore, are effectively limited to the “specifically and uniquely attributable” part of the Illinois takings test. A home rule unit’s responsibility
to comply with this part of the constitutional takings test is discussed in Section III.
E.

ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN FEDERAL TAKINGS ANALYSES

As Illinois courts continued to apply the stringent “specifically and
uniquely attributable” standard to exactions, the U.S. Supreme Court also
further developed its body of law under the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause. In the 2005 case of Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,161 the court categorized the various types of takings challenges it had recognized.162 “The
paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.”163 Over time, however,
the Court recognized that government regulations could be so onerous as to
be compensable.164 Two categories of regulation are deemed per se takings:
(1) where there is a permanent physical invasion of property as in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,165 in which a state law required landlords to allow cable companies to install cable boxes in apartments, and (2)
where regulations completely deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use of property, as in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council.166 Other regulatory
takings claims must be analyzed by the factors set out in Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. N.Y.C.167 Those factors include “the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations” and “the character of
the government action.”168 Outside of these three categories, there is a “special context of land-use exactions.”169 Nollan and Dolan embody this special
context. As the court explained, those cases “involved dedications of property so onerous that, outside the exactions context, they would be deemed per
161. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
162. Id. at 540. The Court also corrected a misapplication many lower courts had made
determining whether a regulation effected a Fifth Amendment taking. It found the “the application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests,” which had “been read to announce a standalone regulatory takings test” independent of Penn Central, was incorrect. Id. “We conclude
that this formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, and
that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.” Id.
163. Id. at 537.
164. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537.
165. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
166. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
167. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
168. Id.
169. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
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se physical takings.”170 According to the court in Lingle, the interests the
government was promoting through exactions in those cases were not challenged as illegitimate:
Rather, the issue was whether the exactions substantially advanced the same interests that land-use authorities asserted
would allow them to deny the permit altogether. As the
Court explained in Dolan, these cases involve a special application of the “doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’”
which provides that “the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public
use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by
the government where the benefit has little or no relationship
to the property.171
This concept of unconstitutional conditions as applied in land use exactions was further amplified in the 2013 case of Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. District,172 a case of great import in the field of exactions. In this
case, a Florida landowner who wanted to develop his property challenged a
water management district’s denial of his request for land use permits unless
he funded offsite mitigation projects on public lands. The landowner alleged
the denial was a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. This case expanded the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
to include “extortionate demands for property” even when no property of any
kind has been taken:
Extortionate demands for property in the land-use permitting
context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they
take property but because they impermissibly burden the
right not to have property taken without just compensation.
As in other unconstitutional conditions cases in which someone refuses to cede a constitutional right in the face of coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a governmental
benefit is a constitutionally cognizable injury.173
Writing for the majority in the five-to-four decision, Justice Alito noted
that the Nollan/Dolan cases reflected “two realities” co-existing in the land
use permitting process.174 First, “permit applicants are especially vulnerable
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 547.
Id.
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. District, 570 U.S. 595 (2013).
Id. at 607.
Id. at 604.
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to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits
because the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit that is
worth far more than property it would like to take.”175 As long as the permit
is more valuable than the property the government wants to take, a landowner
will agree to the taking, “no matter how unreasonable.”176 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits such government demands that run counter to the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation.177 The second coexisting reality is that many proposed land uses impose real costs on the public that can be justifiably borne by the proposer.178 For example, a projected
increase in traffic can be offset by widening public roads.179 Justice Alito
remarked that, “[i]nsisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a hallmark of responsible land-use policy, and we
have long sustained such regulations against constitutional attack.”180 The
Nollan/Dolan tests balance these two realities by allowing the government to
mitigate negative impacts of a proposed development as long as they require
mitigation that has an essential nexus and rough proportionality to those impacts.181
A key holding of Koontz was that “so-called ‘in lieu of’ fees . . . are
functionally equivalent to other types of land use exactions.”182 As such,
those monetary exactions must satisfy the nexus and rough proportionality
requirements if they burden a specific parcel of land.183 If a monetary exaction was not subject to Nollan/Dolan, it would be easy for a government to
side-step the Fifth Amendment’s requirement in a land-use permitting situation—it would simply require a payment of money if a permit applicant did
not acquiesce to a land dedication request.184 What is important here is that
Koontz makes clear that in lieu monetary requests do not amount to a regulatory taking that would be subject to a Penn Central-type factual analysis.
Instead:
When the government commands the relinquishment of
funds linked to a specific, identifiable property interest such
as a bank account or parcel of real property, a “per se [takings] approach” is the proper mode of analysis under the
175. Id. at 605.
176. Id.
177. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 605.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding zoning regulation)).
181. Id. at 605-06.
182. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 6012.
183. Id. at 613-14.
184. Id. at 612.
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Court’s precedent. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538
U.S. 216, 235, 123 S.Ct. 1406, 155 L.E.2d 376 (2003).185
The court distinguished its 1998 holding in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.186 In that case a plurality of Justices “applied a takings analysis to a monetary obligation” imposed under the federal Coal Act, “but a majority of Justices rejected the theory that an obligation to pay money constitutes a taking.”187 The Supreme Court found that Eastern Enterprises did not control
Koontz because in Koontz the demand for money burdened the ownership of
a specific parcel of land.188 There was a direct link between the government’s
demand and a specific parcel of real property for which a developer was seeking a permit.189 Consequently, the exaction required in Koontz implicated
“the central concern of Nollan and Dolan: the risk that the government may
use its substantial power and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the
effects of the proposed new use of the specific property at issue, thereby diminishing without justification the value of the property.”190 In sum, the court
found that a per se taking occurs “when the government commands the relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, identifiable property interest such
as a bank account or parcel of real property.”191
In Horne v. United States Department of Agric., a 2015 case, the U.S.
Supreme Court again found the Nollan/Dolan takings test to be applicable.192
In that case, Federal Department of Agriculture regulations imposed in an
effort to help maintain stable markets required raisin growers to set aside a
certain percentage of their raisin crop for the account of the government without payment.193 The court found that “a governmental mandate to relinquish
185. Id. at 614.
186. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
187. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 613. On due process grounds (not a takings analysis), Justice
Kennedy concurred with the four justices who invalidated the retroactive imposition on a former mining company an obligation to pay for the medical benefits of retired miners and families as a Takings Clause violation but joined the dissenting justices in concluding that the
Takings Clause was not applicable to financial obligations not operating upon an identified
property interest. Id.
188. Id. (“Unlike the financial obligation in Eastern Enterprises, the demand for
money at issue here did ‘operate upon . . . an identified property interest’ by directing the
owner of a particular piece of property to make a monetary payment.”).
189. Id. at 614.
190. Id.
191. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 614. Well before the Supreme Court in Koontz held that monetary obligations had to have a direct link to a specific piece of property in order to bring the
Takings Clause into play, the Illinois Supreme Court came to the same decision. Empress
Casino Joliet v. Giannoulias, 869 N.E.2d 277 (Ill. 2008).
192. Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 135 S.Ct. 2419, 2424 (2015).
193. Id.
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specific, identifiable property as a ‘condition’ on permission to engage in
commerce effects a per se taking.”194
There is much in Koontz and Horne, including the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, that may support further scrutiny of government exactions
under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.195 The Supreme Court in both
cases has signaled that Nollan/Dolan requirements are alive and well.196
This concludes the description of the history of Illinois’ “specifically
and uniquely attributable” test created by the Illinois Supreme Court to analyze takings challenges under the Illinois Constitution. As a test for whether
a government exaction “goes too far,” the Illinois requirement is more stringent than that imposed under the federal Constitution. When it should be applied, however, is consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of how
the Constitution protects property owners from exactions that have little connection to a valid government interest or are not proportional to the needs a
proposed land use creates. The next sections will argue that the test is applicable to Illinois home rule units and to legislative acts.
III. THE “SPECIFICALLY AND UNIQUELY ATTRIBUTABLE” TEST IS
APPLICABLE TO HOME RULE MUNICIPALITIES AND COUNTIES

As crafted by the Illinois Supreme Court, the constitutional test to be
applied to fees imposed on developers by local governments comprises two
parts. The “specifically and uniquely attributable” standard is actually the
second step when a court determines whether impact fees pass muster under
the Illinois Constitution. The first step only requires determining whether a
local government has the authority to impose those fees.197 Regardless of how
194. Id. at 2430. The court also held that the Fifth Amendment protects personal property equally as well as real property. Id. at 2425-26.
195. Peter A. Clodfelter & Edward J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process through the
Just Compensation Clause: Understanding Koontz’s ‘Special Application’ of the Doctrine of
Unconstitutional Conditions by Tracing the Doctrine’s History, 46 THE URB. LAW. 569, 62223 (2014).
196. In a contrary opinion, a federal district court in Illinois missed the boat in dismissing a takings challenge to the City of Chicago’s Affordable Housing Ordinance, which
required developers of ten or more housing units to sell or lease ten percent of those units as
affordable housing or pay $100,000 per unit that was not so restricted. The court misread the
import of Koontz and found no per se or regulatory taking that would allow the case to proceed.
197. Pioneer Tr. and Sav. Bank, 176 N.E.2d at 802, in which the court stated:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to the municipality and if the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely
attributable to his activity, then the requirement is permissible; if not, it is
forbidden and amounts to a confiscation of private property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable regulation
under the police power.
Id. (emphasis added).
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home rule municipalities and counties perceive the breadth of their authority,
the second step of the Illinois takings test still applies to home rule units. This
section will explore the difference between home rule and non-home rule
authority under the Illinois Constitution and conclude that, while home rule
units have constitutional authority to impose impact fees for a variety of purposes relating to their own government, that authority provides a basis for
meeting only the first part of the takings test.
When Illinois adopted a new constitution in 1970, it gave home rule
powers to all municipalities with populations exceeding 25,000 and those
whose residents adopted home rule by a referendum.198 Counties with a certain type of government structure were also given home rule power.199 Under
home rule authority, a governmental unit (unless limited by the General Assembly as stated in the Constitution) may exercise any power and perform
any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety,
morals, and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.200 Home rule power
has been interpreted as being co-extensive with the powers of the State.201
Non-home rule municipalities have only the enumerated powers granted
to them by the Illinois Constitution or other “powers granted to [them] by
law,” that is, powers conferred on them either expressly or impliedly by statute.202 In sum, non-home rule municipalities “possess only those powers
198. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6. Residents of municipalities may also vote by referendum
to remove home rule power from their local government. Id. There are currently 215 municipalities with home rule powers. See, e.g., Home Rule Municipalities, ILL. MUN. LEAGUE,
http://legal.iml.org/page.cfm?key=2 [https://perma.cc/X8B3-W4RD].
199. Id. Cook County, Illinois was the only county qualifying for home rule status in
1970 and remains the only county out of Illinois’ 102 counties with home rule power.
200. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
201. Blanchard v. Berrios, 72 N.E.3d 309, 317-18, 322 (Ill. 2016) (Cook County is a
home rule unit “invested with the same sovereign power as the state government, except where
explicitly limited by the legislature” and may establish an independent inspector general who
may require an elected county assessor to respond to subpoenas just as the State may do); City
of Chicago v. StubHub, Inc., 979 N.E.2d 844, 851-52 (Ill. 2011); Schillerstrom Homes, Inc.
v. City of Naperville, 762 N.E.2d 494, 497 (Ill. 2001); Bremen Cmty. High School Dist. No.
228 v. Cook Cty. Comm’n on Human Rights, 981 N.E.2d 369, 380-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
2012).
202. Pesticide Pub. Policy Found. v. Vill. of Wauconda, 510 N.E.2d 858, 860-61 (Ill.
1987). Powers granted to non-home rule units are limited. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 7. This section provides:
Counties and municipalities which are not home rule units shall have only
powers granted to them by law and the powers (1) to make local improvements by special assessment and to exercise this power jointly with other
counties and municipalities, and other classes of units of local government
having that power on the effective date of this Constitution unless that
power is subsequently denied by law to any such other units of local government; (2) by referendum, to adopt, alter or repeal their forms of
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expressly granted [by the Legislature], powers incident to those expressly
granted, and powers indispensable to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the municipal corporation.”203 Grants of powers to municipalities are to be strictly construed, and where there is doubt as to the
existence of a power, the doubt must be resolved against the municipality.204
Ordinances enacted without authority are ultra vires and void.205 As discussed above, the courts have strictly construed the ability of non-home rule
units of government to impose impact fees. Where, for example, the state
enabling statute authorized reasonable requirements for “school grounds,”
fees for school building construction was deemed to be ultra vires.206 Similarly, when the statute’s definition of school grounds was expanded to include building construction, a court found that it still did not authorize a nonhome rule village to impose exactions for school operations.207
The 1970 Illinois Constitution, creating home rule units, was a revolutionary change for local government.208 It generated much litigation on the
extent of home rule power that was granted to municipalities and how such
power could be curtailed. In general, Illinois courts over the years upheld the
broad powers of a home rule government to enact any ordinance pertaining
to its government and affairs.209 As long as the General Assembly had not
invoked one of the limitations on home rule authority allowed by the Constitution,210 the ordinance did not infringe on another constitutional branch of

Id.

government provided by law; (3) in the case of municipalities, to provide
by referendum for their officers, manner of selection and terms of office;
(4) in the case of counties, to provide for their officers, manner of selection and terms of office as provided in Section 4 of this Article; (5) to
incur debt except as limited by law and except that debt payable from ad
valorem property tax receipts shall mature within 40 years from the time
it is incurred; and (6) to levy or impose additional taxes upon areas within
their boundaries in the manner provided by law for the provision of special
services to those areas and for the payment of debt incurred in order to
provide those special services.

203. Pesticide Pub. Policy Found., 510 N.E.2d at 861.
204. Id.; Osborn v. Vill. of River Forest, 171 N.E.2d 579 (Ill. 1961).
205. McGovern v. City of Chicago, 118 N.E. 3 (Ill. 1917).
206. Thompson v. Vill. of Newark, 768 N.E.2d at 860.
207. Raintree Homes, 906 N.E.2d at 766-67.
208. Joan G. Anderson & Ann Lousin, From Bone Gap to Chicago: A History of the
Local Government Article of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, 9 J. MARSHALL PRAC. & PROC.
697, 742 (1976).
209. E.g., S. Bloom, Inc. v. Korshak, 284 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. 1972); Cain v. American
Nat’l Bank and Tr. Co. of Chicago, 325 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1975) (state zoning
enabling statue did not apply because a home rule unit gets its authority to zone from the
Constitution).
210. E.g., United Private Detective & Sec. Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 343 N.E.2d 453
(Ill. 1976) (General Assembly used Section 6(i) of Article VII to declare exclusive State
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government,211 or the ordinance governed a matter that was clearly one that
required exclusive state control;212 the courts would not void a home rule
ordinance on the basis that it lacked authority. The Illinois Constitution,
therefore, appeared to give home rule units vast powers.
With respect to impact fees, the expanded power of home rule governments was confirmed in Northern Illinois Home Builders, where the Illinois
Supreme Court stated that the state Road Impact Fee statute did not grant
home rule municipalities the authority to impose impact fees; home rule governments already possessed the authority to enact such fees under the 1970
Constitution and did not need an enabling statute.213 According to the court,
the Road Impact Fee Act merely curtailed that existing power by imposing
minimum standards and procedures.214 If a home rule municipality derives
control over private detective licensing and regulation); Andruss v. City of Evanston, 369
N.E.2d 1258 (Ill. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978) (General Assembly used Sections
6(h) and (i) of Article VII to declare exclusive control over real estate brokers and salesmen
licensing and regulation); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. City of Chicago, 362 N.E.2d 1021 (Ill.
1977) (using Art. VII, Sec. 6(g), Illinois insurance code preempted home rule ordinance imposing taxes pertaining to business of insurance companies).
211. E.g., Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 338 N.E.2d 15 (Ill. 1975) (home rule county
could not impose filing fees on civil cases to fund a county library because judicial system in
Illinois statewide concern and not for local regulation); Village of Glenview v. Zwick, 826
N.E.2d 1171 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2005) (fee-shifting ordinance invalidated because it burdened access to courts by imposing attorney fees on person challenging ordinance); City of
Carbondale v. Yehling, 451 N.E.2d 837 (Ill. 1983) (city ordinance may not dictate procedures
for court to follow).
212. E.g., People ex rel. Lignoul v. City of Chicago, 368 N.E.2d 100 (Ill. 1977) (branch
banking is a state-wide concern and does not pertain to local government and affairs); Peoples
Gas Light and Coke Co. v. City of Chicago, 465 N.E.2d 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1984)
(utility regulation was always a matter of state concern and not appropriate for home rule);
Village of Dolton v. CSX Transp., Inc., 554 N.E.2d 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990) (Illinois
Commerce Commission has exclusive control over railroad regulation).
213. N. Ill. Home Builders, 649 N.E.2d at 392:
Indeed, home rule units had the power under Section 6 of Article VII of
the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. ART. VII, § 6) to implement impact
fees prior to the passage of the second enabling act. Rather, instead of
creating special powers for home rule units which they did not already
possess, the second enabling act curtailed that power by setting forth ‘minimum standards and procedures’ for the imposition of impact fees, ‘so that
the burden of paying for road improvements can be allocated in a fair and
equitable manner.’
Id.
214. Id. In Krughoff, 369 N.E.2d at 892, the city had asserted that it passed the ordinance pursuant to its home rule powers granted under the 1970 Illinois Constitution, but court
declined to determine whether the ordinance was authorized by home rule powers, deciding
instead that if the city could pass the ordinance under existing statutes granting municipalities
the authority to control and plan subdivisions, then it certainly had authority to do so under its
home rule powers. Id. at 896. The court also addressed Justice Schaefer’s concern in Surety
Developers that Section 8 of the plan commission statute required a municipality to purchase

128

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

39-1

its authority from the Illinois Constitution and is not dependent upon State
enabling legislation, then its ability to impose impact fees is not limited to
streets, sewers, schools, and the other items authorized by the Plan Commission sections in the Municipal Code and the Counties Code. It could, theoretically, impose impact fees on new developments for libraries, fire stations,
open space, cultural centers, or any other amenity the municipal government
determines is needed to secure the public welfare.215
Although a home rule municipality possesses the authority to impose
impact fees, that authority only satisfies the first part of a takings analysis
under the Illinois Constitution. Under Northern Illinois Home Builders, state
legislation imposing or authorizing property exactions must comply with the
“specifically and uniquely attributable” standard in order to pass constitutional muster in Illinois. If the State must comply with this standard, then
home rule municipalities most certainly should also be held to the same
standard when they enact impact fees and other exactions under their police
powers. Illinois courts have confirmed as much by implication, if not by explicit rulings, in cases involving home rule municipalities. 216
or condemn property for school and park sites without regard to the proportioned need created
by the particular development. The court held that Section 8 authorized purchase or condemnation of land designated for schools and parks but that it was not a limitation on municipal
power. Rather, it was a power in addition to a municipality’s power to require the dedication
of land, or money in lieu of land, proportioned to the need for new school and park facilities
uniquely attributable to the new subdivision. Id. at 895.
215. In Plote, Inc. v. Minn. Alden Co., 422 N.E.2d 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1981), a
developer obtained a zoning change from the Village of Schaumburg by voluntarily agreeing
to make per unit payments to the village for a cultural center. The Appellate Court held that
the developer could not challenge the validity of the ordinance after it had accepted the benefits of the agreement. The court did not reach the issue as to whether the purpose of the exaction was authorized by statute or home rule authority. The court did note (in dicta), however,
that the payment requirement was suspect under the “attributability and proportionality tests”
created by the Illinois Supreme Court because a cultural center was “an amalgam of educational and recreational functions, without the element of public necessity accorded to either
one.” Id. at 236. “A cultural center is not a recreational facility in the more usual sense of a
park or a playground, nor is it an educational necessity, in the manner of a school.” Id.
Schaumburg is a home rule unit now, but its status in 1972 when the ordinance was passed is
unclear. According to Wikipedia, its population in 1970 was 18,730. In 1980, it was 53,305.
Correspondence with village employees indicated that the village became a home rule unit at
the time its population exceeded 25,000, probably around 1974. This distinction is important
for determining whether the village had home rule authority to require an impact fee for something not specifically mentioned in the plan commission statute authorizing dedications and
reasonable standards for streets, schools, etc. Thus, the court implied that municipal exactions
for a community cultural center might be invalid, but it declined “further comment until the
issue is properly before this court.” Id.
216. Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. 1st Dist.,
1995). According to Wikipedia, Schaumburg’s population as of 1980 exceeded 25,000, so it
likely was a home-rule municipality at the time this litigation started. The court did not engage
in any discussion regarding the home rule unit status of the village origin of the village’s power
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Consequently, a home rule municipality that wants to impose impact
fees on new subdivisions for things like libraries, cultural centers, swimming
pools, low-income housing, police and fire fighting facilities, and other
amenities should face a high standard to show how the need for those facilities is “specifically and uniquely attributable” to each new development.
Over the years, local governments have developed formulas for analyzing
traffic and population increases to justify road improvements and new
schools.217 Fees for other public amenities should be justified by the same
types of rigorous analysis in order to prove that they are “specifically and
uniquely attributable” to a new subdivision. Even the federal standard of
“rough proportionality” requires findings that quantify government needs beyond conclusory statements.218 Home rule entities are not immune from complying with constitutional requirements.
Further, impact fee calculations need to be updated periodically, 219 especially as Illinois continues to lose population.220 Impact fees in many Illinois municipalities that have funded new schools, parks, and other amenities
may no longer be needed and could be subject to successful challenges on
this basis. This is an important point, a new development should pay its fair
share of the additional needs it generates, but it should not pay for improving
to place conditions on special use permits. Instead, it applied the Supreme Court’s Fifth
Amendment rough proportionality standard to invalidate the dedication of land requested by
the village as a condition to approving a special use permit and did not need to apply Illinois’
stricter test. Amoco Oil Co., 661 N.E.2d at 391. “Clearly, because we find that the dedication
requirement does not satisfy the more lenient rough proportionality test for the Federal Constitution, it follows that it also did not satisfy the specifically and uniquely attributable approach with respect to the State Constitution.” Id.
217. See, e.g., WILL COUNTY, ILLINOIS, Plans & Studies: 2009 Transportation Plan,
http://www.willcountyillinois.com/County-Offices/Economic-Development/Land-Use/Administration-Planning/Long-Range-Planning-Projects [https://perma.cc/J3CA-QBBN].
218. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395-96. “No precise mathematical calculation is required, but
the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication for the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the
traffic demand generated.” Id.
219. AM. PLANNING ASS’N, supra note 2 (fees “should be reviewed at least every two
years”).
220. Marwa Eltagouri, Illinois loses more residents in 2016 than any other state, CHI.
TRIB., (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-illinois-population-decline-met-20161220-story.html [https://perma.cc/EV3N-D3RJ] (“For the third consecutive year, Illinois has lost more residents than any other state, losing 37,508 people in
2016, which puts its population at the lowest it has been in nearly a decade, according to U.S.
census data released Tuesday.”); Cole Lauterbach, Census: Southern Illinois losing population
faster than rest of state, ILL. NEWS NETWORK, (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://www.ilnews.org/news/statewide/census-southern-illinois-losing-population-fasterthan-rest-of-state/article_951bc358-2d53-11e8-ab7d-1b120cd75a52.html
[https://perma.cc/H6CS-KRA2] (With a total population of about 5.2 million people, Cook
County lost more than 45,000 people from July of 2016 to July of 2017; but “the largest percentage of the locals are leaving downstate counties.”).
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what is currently provided for the whole community, regardless of whether
it is located in a home rule or a non-home rule municipality or county. That
would be neither fair nor justifiable under Illinois law.
IV. THE “SPECIFICALLY AND UNIQUELY ATTRIBUTABLE” STANDARD
APPLIES TO LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN ILLINOIS
A number of state and federal courts have decided that legislative acts
like city ordinances cannot be subject to takings analyses because they apply
to all similarly-situated property owners and are not individual administrative
decisions like those involved in Nollan and Dolan.221 Other courts have willingly applied a takings analysis to local legislation.222 In 2016 Justice Thomas
wrote that “[f]or at least two decades . . . lower courts have divided over
whether the Nollan/Dolan test applies in cases where the alleged taking arises
from a legislatively imposed condition rather than an administrative one.”223
The controversy with regard to legislative actions was first noted by Justices
Thomas and O’Connor in their dissent to the denial of certiorari in Parking
Ass’n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta.224 In the state court case, the Georgia
Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance requiring certain existing surface
parking lots to include landscaped areas equal to at least 10 percent of the
paved area and to have at least one tree for every eight parking spaces.225 The
Georgia court refused to apply a Nollan/Dolan analysis because the ordinance was a legislative act that applied to many landowners.226 When the
United States Supreme Court denied the Parking Association’s petition for
certiorari, Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in which he noted that some courts

221. Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 252-57 (2000).
222. David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land Use
Takings Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 48-53 (2014); Marc J. Herman, The Continuing Struggle
Against Government Extortion, and Why the Time Is Now Right to Employ Heightened Scrutiny to All Exactions, 46 URB. LAW. 655 (2014).
223. California Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S.Ct. 928 (2016) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the denial of certiorari). This case involved a housing ordinance that compelled new residential developments of twenty or more units to reserve at least 15% of them
for low income buyers. Justice Thomas concurred that the case did not present an opportunity
to decide the legislative/adjudicative controversy because the petitioner did not rely on Nollan
or Dolan in the court below. See also Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir.
1998) (“The scope of Dolan's rough proportionality test in takings cases is in considerable
doubt. For example, the Supreme Court has left unsettled the question whether Dolan's rough
proportionality test applies to legislative, as opposed to administrative exactions.”).
224. Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995).
225. Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert.
denied, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995).
226. Id. at 203, n.3.
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had indeed applied Nollan/Dolan to legislative acts, creating a conflict
among the courts.227 He remarked:
It is not clear why the existence of a taking should turn on
the type of governmental entity responsible for the taking. A
city council can take property just as well as a planning commission can. Moreover, the general applicability of the ordinance should not be relevant in a takings analysis. If Atlanta
had seized several hundred homes in order to build a freeway, there would be no doubt that Atlanta had taken property. The distinction between sweeping legislative takings
and particularized administrative takings appears to be a distinction without a constitutional difference.228
Thus, in the opinion of Justices Thomas and O’Connor, whether an exaction was extracted by legislation or administrative action was not relevant
to whether a takings analysis could be applied.
Indeed, wherever the power to command exactions from landowners
arises—from legislation or adjudication—the U.S. Constitution provides a
valuable and essential limitation on extortionate behavior. For example, as
one commentator has asserted, without an available constitutional check, the
legislative process could be used to impose exactions on a minority group.229
The legislative process in the local government setting may be particularly
vulnerable to “majoritarianism,” as many smaller communities are less diverse and have fewer distinct constituencies that are able to influence elections and legislative enactments.230 Using Nollan/Dolan, a court can offer
protection by invalidating statutes and ordinances that do not stand up to
scrutiny. Furthermore, on the local level, the distinction between legislation
and adjudication is often less than clear.231

227. Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. at 1117 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 1117-18 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
229. David L. Callies & Glenn H. Sonoda, Providing Infrastructure for Smart Growth:
Land Development Conditions, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 351, 369 (2007) (“[I]t is entirely possible
that the government could ‘gang up’ on particular groups to force exactions that a majority of
constituents would not only tolerate but applaud . . . .”); see also Jane C. Needleman, Note:
Exactions: Exploring Exactly when Nollan and Dolan Should be Triggered, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1563, 1588-90 (December, 2006); David L. Callies & Adrienne I. Suarez, Symposium:
Democracy in Action: The Law & Politics of Local Governance: Privatization and the Providing of Public Facilities through Private Means, 21 J.L. & POL. 477, 491 (2005).
230. See Reznik, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 271; Herman, 46 URB. LAW. at 680.
231. Reznik, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 266; B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cty., 128
P.3d 1161, 1170 (Utah 2006).
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Nevertheless, whether the federal takings analysis is applicable to exactions imposed under state or local legislation is an unanswered question. 232
Courts around the country are divided on the answer. Even courts within the
same federal districts have reached contrary conclusions.233
San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco,234 involved
a city ordinance that required a single resident occupancy (“SRO”) building
owner to replace the resident hotel rooms or pay an in lieu fee to a housing
fund before converting the property into a tourist hotel. The California Supreme Court held that the ordinance was valid and refused to apply a Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny takings analysis to a monetary exaction imposed as a legislative mandate without administrative discretion.235 “While
legislatively mandated fees do present some danger of improper leveraging,
such generally applicable legislation is subject to the ordinary restraints of
the democratic political process.”236 The court in this case was confident that
a truly extortionate scheme would cause voters to change the composition of
the city council at the next election.237 Further, the city ordinance was still
subject to both statutory and constitutional law, which required the court to
find that the city ordinance seeking to preserve the supply of low income
housing had a reasonable relationship to the requirements imposed on the
SRO building owners.238 Even this court, however, was not unanimous as to
whether legislative and adjudicative actions should be distinguished. Dissenting Justice Brown wrote that in this case, the city government’s ordinances were tantamount to extortion and were obviously unconstitutional.239
Relying on the California Supreme Court decision in Ehrlich v. City of Culver, in which the court applied Nolan’s heightened scrutiny test, Justice
Brown reasoned:
A public agency can just as easily extort unfair fees legislatively from a class of property owners as it can adjudicatively from a single property owner. The nature of the wrong
232. Washington Townhomes., LLC v. Washington Cnty. Water Conservancy Dist.,
388 P.3d 753, 757-58 (Utah 2016) (the case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds as not
properly certified and remanded for further proceedings).
233. Compare Levin v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 71 F.Supp.3d 1072 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (under Koontz, 5th Amendment takings analysis applied to ordinance requiring exorbitant payments to tenants when owner terminates tenancy) with Bldg. Indus. Ass’n – Bay Area
v. City of Oakland, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (Koontz did not expand doctrine
to reach legislative acts, such as ordinance requiring developers to fund public art installations).
234. San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002).
235. Id. at 105-06.
236. Id. at 105.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 105-06.
239. San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 124 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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is not different or less abusive to its victims, but the scope of
the wrong is multiplied many times over. Therefore, I believe Ehrlich should apply whenever the risk is great that
greed for public revenues has driven public regulatory policy. In other words, where a legislative scheme imposes a
burdensome fee on a small class of property owners as a condition to buying relief from a regulation, I believe careful
judicial scrutiny is appropriate, including finding a close link
between the fee and the purpose of the regulation. In light of
the majority’s decision, however, we can be sure that agencies will now act legislatively, rather than adjudicatively,
and thereby insulate their actions from close judicial scrutiny.240
The California Supreme Court more recently reiterated this conclusion
in California Building Industry Ass’n v. City of San Jose,241 when it held that
an inclusionary housing ordinance was a land use restriction, not a taking
subject to scrutiny beyond the rational relationship test.
In Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass’n v. DeKalb County,242 the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld a county tree ordinance applying uniformly
to all unincorporated land and regulating the removal and/or replacement of
trees as part of land development. Citing its own decision in Parking Ass’n
v. City of Atlanta, the court held that a takings analysis was inapplicable to a
generally-applicable legislation.243

240. Id. Justice Brown first asserted that the majority misread the city’s ordinance as
leaving no discretion to the planning commission and that its actions were actually adjudicative; however, he also concluded that “the majority’s exception for legislatively created permit
fees is mere sophism, particularly where the legislation affects a relatively powerless group
and therefore the restraints inherent in the political process can hardly be said to have worked.”
Id..
241. California Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 351 P.3d 974, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016).
242. Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass’n v. DeKalb Cty., 588 S.E.2d 694 (Ga. 2003).
243. Id. at 697 (citing Parking Ass’n, 450 S.E.2d 200 (1994)). See also Garneau, 147
F.3d at 811 (“The scope of Dolan’s rough proportionality test in takings case is in considerable
doubt. For example, the Supreme Court has left unsettled the question whether Dolan’s rough
proportionality tests applies to legislative, as opposed to administrative exactions.”); Homebuilders Ass’n v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz. 1997) (there may be good
reasons to distinguish an adjudicative decision from a legislative one); Golf Course Ass’n v.
New Castle Cty., 2016 WL 1425367, aff’d 152 A.3d 581(“many courts have held that general
statutory restrictions, evenly applied, do not constitute an unconstitutional exaction under
[Nollan/Dolan /Koontz].”) (In this case, there is a statutory scheme applicable to all property
owners).
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On the other side of the issue, in Levin v. City and County of San Francisco,244 the Northern District of California held that an ordinance requiring
property owners who wanted to withdraw their rent-controlled property from
the rental market to pay a lump sum to displaced tenants effected “an unconstitutional taking by conditioning property owners’ right to withdraw their
property on a monetary exaction not sufficiently related to the impact of the
withdrawal.”245 The court carefully analyzed Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz to
conclude that, although the city’s housing shortage and high rental costs were
significant, it could not achieve its goal of ameliorating its housing problem
by forcing “some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”246 The court did not
even address the city’s argument that the ordinance could not be subject to a
takings claim because the exactions were legislatively imposed on all landlords except in a footnote.247 The court wrote:
The City's reliance on McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d
1219 (9th Cir. 2008) for the argument that Nollan/Dolan
does not apply to legislative conditions also is misplaced.
Koontz abrogated McClung's holding that Nollan/Dolan
does not apply to monetary exactions, which is intertwined
with and underlies McClung's assumptions about legislative
conditions. And a very recent Ninth Circuit case reinforces
the applicability of the Nollan/Dolan framework to facial reviews of legislative exactions. In Horne, 750 F.3d 1128, the
Ninth Circuit reviewed and rejected a takings challenge to a
Marketing Order that required raisin producers to hold back
a certain amount of their crop from the market. There, the
Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the Order satisfied the Nollan/Dolan essential nexus and rough proportionality tests. In
so doing, the court explained that Dolan's individualized
244. Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1072, appeal dismissed as moot and remanded, 680 Fed.
Appx. 610 (N.D. Cal. 2017), on remand, motion to vacate denied, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1092 (N.D.
Cal. 2017).
245. Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1074.
246. Id. at 1089 (quoting Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960)).
247. Id. at 1083, n. 4. The City also relied on Garneau, 147 F.3d 802, to assert that
Nollan/Dolan could not be applied in a facial takings claim, but the court noted that:
Garneau was decided before Koontz explicitly extended the Nollan/Dolan
framework to monetary exactions, and much of Garneau’s analysis relies
on an assumed limitation to physical exactions that Koontz repudiated.
After Koontz broadened the scope of Nollan/Dolan to monetary exactions,
it opened up the applicability of the rough proportionality test to the nature
and terms, in addition to the amount, of the enhanced payments the Ordinance requires here.
Id.
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review of a particular land-permit condition made sense
there, because “in the land use context . . . the development
of each parcel is considered on a case-by-case basis. But
here, the [raisin] use restriction is imposed evenly across the
industry; all producers must contribute an equal percentage
of their overall crop to the reserve pool.” The court went on
to conclude that the Marketing Order was tailored to the government interests under Nollan/Dolan because it varied the
reserve requirement annually in accordance with market
conditions.248
Although relegated to a footnote, the court’s dismissal of the legislativeadjudication dispute is well-reasoned and ties Koontz’s expansion of Nollan/Dolan to monetary exactions with Horne’s application of Nollan/Dolan
to legislation.249
Remarkably, another judge in the Northern District of California criticized Judge Breyer’s opinion in Levin as wrongly expanding federal takings
analyses to legislative acts. In Building Industry Ass’n – Bay Area v. City of
Oakland,250 a city ordinance required new developments to purchase and display art works on site or pay an “in lieu of” fee to the city’s public art fund.
Judge Chhabria held that Judge Breyer’s interpretation of Koontz was incorrect and that applying a takings analysis to legislative acts was wrong:
The exactions doctrine, in other words, has historically been
understood as a means to protect against abuse of discretion
by land-use officials with respect to an individual’s parcels
of land, and Koontz itself spoke of it in those terms, undermining Judge Breyer’s argument that Koontz displaced the
Ninth Circuit’s rule that the exactions doctrine is unavailable
248. Id. (quoting Horne, 750 F.3d at 1144) (citations omitted).
249. Another example is the New York State court case of Seawall Assocs. v. City of
New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989). In that case, a city ordinance prohibited conversion/demolition of single resident occupancy housing and required restoration of all units and
leasing at controlled rents. The court held that the ordinance was facially invalid as an unconstitutional taking under the 5th Amendment as applied to the States: (1) forcing owners to rent
was a physical occupation; and (2) all provisions of the ordinance were a regulatory taking
that denied economically viable use without substantial advancement of a legitimate State
interest. The ordinance’s buyouts (“in lieu of fees”) and hardship exemptions could not save
an unconstitutional ordinance because one cannot pay the city not to violate the Constitution.
Id. at 1070. “Indeed, the stark alternatives offered by Local Law No. 9—either submit to an
uncompensated and, therefore, unconstitutional appropriation of your properties or pay the
price (in cash or in replacement units)—amount to just the sort of exaction which could be
classified, not as ‘a valid regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’’” Id.
(quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981).
250. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
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to a plaintiff making a facial challenge to a generally applicable land-use regulation.
Perhaps reasonable arguments could be made for expanding
the reach of the exactions doctrine so that it can be invoked
in facial challenges to a generally applicable regulations, rather than merely discretionary decisions regarding an individual property by land-use officials. But the point, for purposes of this motion, is that it would be an expansion of the
doctrine. If that occurs, it should be in the Supreme Court,
not the Northern District of California.251
Judge Chhabria might have been literally right—Koontz did not explicitly expand Nollan/Dolan application to legislative acts, as it involved denial
of an individual land use permit request—but Judge Breyer appeared to have
the more nuanced take on the issue. In Horne, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
personal property (raisins) was afforded less Fifth Amendment protection
than real property,252 but that court did not categorically oppose applying
Nollan/Dolan to legislative acts. In fact, the Ninth Circuit demonstrated that
Nollan/Dolan provided an appropriate framework for analyzing whether the
generally applicable Market Order issued by the government confiscating a
percentage of raisin growers’ crops constituted a taking.253 The Ninth Circuit
found that the Market Order, which each year varied the percentage of raisins
to be appropriated, was adequately “individualized” and, therefore, satisfied
Dolan’s requirement of rough proportionality to the government’s goal of
assuring a stable market.254 The court did not discuss whether Nollan/Dolan
was inapplicable because the Market Order was legislation rather than an adjudicative act. Neither did the U.S. Supreme Court discuss the generally-applicable nature of the Market Order to all raisin growers when it reversed
Horne. However, because the Supreme Court concluded that the Market Order resulted in a physical per se taking, the issue of whether the Supreme

251.
252.
253.
254.

Id.

Id. at 1058-59 (citation omitted).
Horne, 750 F.3d at 1128, rev’d 135 S.Ct. 2419 (2015).
Id. at 1142-43.
Id. at 1144. The opinion states:
At bottom, Dolan’s individualized review ensures the government’s implementation of the regulations is tailored to the interest the government
seeks to protect. The Marketing Order accomplishes this goal by varying
the reserve requirement annually in accordance with market and industry
conditions. Given that raisins are fungible (as opposed to land), we think
this is enough to ensure the means of the Marketing Order’s diversion
program is at least roughly proportional to its goals.
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Court would apply a Nollan/Dolan analysis to a legislative act is still unknown.255
That legislative acts can be subject to Illinois’ “specifically and
uniquely attributable” test, however, is not unknown. The Illinois Supreme
Court’s decision in Northern Home Builders stands out as an example of applying a takings analysis to legislation.256 In that case the Illinois Supreme
Court held a legislative act—a state statute—to be subject to the stringent
Illinois takings test and invalidated that state statute because it did not meet
the “specifically and uniquely attributable” standard required under the Illinois Constitution.257 Similarly, Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank, decided
more than 30 years prior to Northern Home Builders, invalidated a non-home
rule ordinance requiring developers to contribute one acre per sixty family
units to the village for public use.258 The Illinois Supreme Court invalidated
the ordinance, not because the village did not have the authority to require a
land dedication, but because “this record did not establish that the need for
recreational and educational facilities” was uniquely and specifically attributable to the proposed subdivision; rather the need for more schools was a result of the continued growth of the whole community.259 To construe the statute as requiring a developer to bear the total cost of an additional school
“would amount to an exercise of the power of eminent domain without compensation.”260
An Illinois appellate court went even further in discussing the issue. In
Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg,261 the court reviewed an ordinance
passed by the Village Board of Trustees. That ordinance required a dedication of land as a condition to approval of the owner’s application for a special
use permit for improvements to a gas station located at a busy intersection.262
The village contended that a takings analysis was inapplicable because “its
255. It also adamantly held that personal property was subject to Fifth Amendment
protections equal to those historically granted to real property. Thus, Judge Chharbria’s “historical” understanding of the exactions doctrine as applicable only to land use now appears to
be out-of-date.
256. N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n, 649 N.E.2d 384 (1995).
257. Id. at 388-89 (ordinance required one acre per sixty family units to be dedicated
to the village for public use).
258. Pioneer, 176 N.E.2d at 799.
259. Id. at 802. The parties agreed that there was a need for additional schools and
playgrounds, but the fact that existing schools were near capacity was “the result of the total
development of the community.” Id. The next developer in line should not have to shoulder
the total cost of remedying the school problem.
260. Id.
261. Amoco Oil Co., 661 N.E.2d at 380, appeal denied, 667 N.E.2d 1055 (1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 976 (1996).
262. The landowner met all of the requirements for a special use permit, but the Village
Board of Trustees required an additional land dedication as a condition to granting the permit.
Id. at 383.
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actions were purely legislative in nature rather than adjudicative.” 263 The
court characterized this argument as one that would allow the village to “skirt
its obligation to pay compensation when taking private property for public
use merely by having the Village Board of trustees pass an ‘ordinance’ rather
than having a planning commission issue a permit.”264 The Appellate Court
discussed Parking Ass’n of Georgia, quoted Justice’s Thomas’ dissent, and
concluded that “[a]lthough not binding as precedent, we find Justice Thomas’
comments particularly persuasive and consonant with the rationale underlying Dolan and similar cases. Certainly, a municipality should not be able to
insulate itself from a takings challenge merely by utilizing a different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen’s property.”265 In Illinois, at
least, there is clear precedent that a legislative act can be subject to a takings
analysis.
In addition, although the U.S. Supreme Court in the Koontz case did not
decide whether Nollan/Dolan requirements should apply to legislative acts,
it did cite with approval Northern Illinois Home Builders as an illustration of
a state court that applied a takings analysis to monetary exactions.266 Presumably, if the court did not approve of Illinois’ application of a takings analysis
to a legislative act, it would not have cited the case. At any rate, the “specifically and uniquely attributable” test in Illinois is clearly a takings standard
under the Illinois Constitution that has been applied to legislative acts in Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank, Northern Illinois Home Builders, and Amoco
Oil.267 Should the U.S. Supreme Court ever decide that Nollan/Dolan is not
263. Id. at 389.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 390. The court added that, even if it had recognized a difference between
legislative and adjudicative action, which it did not, the ordinance “did not itself reflect a
uniformly applied legislative policy. Indeed, the dedication requirement was clearly site-specific and adjudicative in character.” Amoco Oil Co., 661 N.E.2d at 390.
266. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 618. “Numerous courts—including courts in many of our
Nation’s most populous States—have confronted constitutional challenges to monetary exactions over the last two decades and applied the standard from Nollan and Dolan or something
like it.” Id., citing N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n, 649 N.E.2d at 388-89.
267. A 2011 case decided by the Illinois Appellate Court, Third District, headed in the
wrong direction, relying on early decisions and ignoring the existing body of case law under
the Illinois Constitution regarding the “specifically and uniquely attributable” standard. Shore
Dev. Co. v. City of Joliet, 2011 IL App (3d) 100911-U, app. denied, 968 N.E.2d (Ill. 2012).
In this Rule 23 Order, the court refused to apply a takings analysis to road improvement fees
required for plat approval that were required under an annexation agreement. Id. The agreement was negotiated by the original owner of a one-hundred-acre tract of farm land that apparently bordered approximately 1,600 feet of Caton Farm Road. It provided that the owner
would pay for public improvements as required by the city’s subdivision regulations. The
original tract was sold in separate parcels to a series of other developers. A church purchased
seventeen acres that bordered Caton Farm Road for 600 feet. As a condition to approving the
church’s subdivision plat, the city required it to assume responsibility for making improvements for the 600 feet of the road. Shore Development, the plaintiff in the case, purchased
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applicable to exaction legislation, it will be interesting to see the fate of the
“specifically and uniquely attributable” standard in Illinois.
V.CONCLUSION
The “specifically and uniquely attributable” takings test under the Illinois Constitution has a long history that remains a viable standard today.
Stricter than the “nexus and rough proportionality” test the U.S. Supreme
Court imposed in the seminal cases of Nollan and Dolan, the Illinois test has
shaped the development of impact fees for both home rule and non-home rule
local governments. When an exaction is required from a landowner and that
exaction is directly tied to a particular land parcel, the “specifically and
uniquely attributable” test must be applied to determine the validity of the
exaction. The home rule status of a municipality or county is relevant only to
determining the authority of the local government to impose impact fees for
streets, schools, parks, and other amenities not enumerated in the enabling
statutes found in the Municipal Code or the Counties Codes. Finally, whether
impact fees are imposed by legislation or adjudication is also not determinative. In Illinois, statutes, ordinances, and adjudicative decisions are all subject
to the Illinois Constitutional requirement that private property not be taken
for public purposes without just compensation.

some lots not previously developed in the first and second phases of development. Altima
Land Group purchased a portion of the lots remaining in the third phase. The city conditioned
approval of Shore Development and Altima’s plats on their assuming responsibility for expanding the remaining 1000 feet of Caton Farm Road to two west bound lanes and for 25% of
the cost of a light signal. Id. at ¶ 12. Shore Development contended that it should not be responsible for the road improvement costs because, among other things, the need for the improvements was not specifically attributable to its development. The appellate court stated that
a takings analysis was applicable only when a proceeding was initiated by the municipality
for the construction of a local improvement or to take property under the law of eminent domain. Id. at ¶ 38. According to the court, the validity of an ordinance was to be evaluated only
under the exercise of police powers. Id. In other words, when a legislative act imposes the
condition, the takings clause is not applicable. This interpretation, however, is clearly not the
law in Illinois and is probably not the law under the federal Constitution. Whether Shore Development’s argument failed because of the annexation agreement negotiated by the prior
owner was determinative (see Dep’t. of Pub. Works & Bldg. v. Exch. Nat. Bank, 31 Ill. App.
3d 88 (2d Dist. 1975), but the exercise of police powers alone was not determinative. Authority
under the police power supports only the first part of the takings analysis expounded by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Pioneer and Northern Illinois Home Builders.

